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Judicial Review and Constitutional
Interpretation in Afghanistan: A Case of
Inconsistency*
BY SHOAIB TIMORY**
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Constitutionalism and separation of powers are distinct features of
modern democracies.1 While democratic constitutions attempt to divide
authorities and responsibilities between the branches of the state as
clearly as possible, differences exist and state branches sometimes
trespass on the territory of other branches out of self-interest.2 This
trespass sometimes results in confrontation between the branches or
violation of individuals’ fundamental rights. To deter such
infringements, judicial review emerged as a mechanism for protecting
the supremacy of the constitution.3
In 1803, Marbury v. Madison was the first critical instance of
exercising judicial review and soon thereafter, a large number of

* Footnotes with the following asterisk indicia (*) were not independently verified by the Loyola
of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review and the reader is thus relying on the
veracity of the author for sources so marked.
** Shoaib Timory is currently serving as Deputy Permanent Representative in Permanent
Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations Office in Geneva. Prior to this role, he worked as
Deputy on State Affairs in the Administrative Office of the President of Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan. Between 2014 and 2019, he worked as an adjunct professor of law at the American
University of Afghanistan where he taught administrative law and international law. Shoaib
Timory has also worked in the capacity of Assistant Country Director on Sub-National
Governance and Development in the Office of the United Nations Development Program in
Kabul between 2010 and 2016. He was also the lead author of the Afghanistan Government
Report to the UN Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against Women in 2010. Shoaib
Timory has an LL.M. from the George Washington University School of Law.
1. Aileen Kavanagh, The Constitutional Separation of Powers, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 221, 221-23 (Dyzenhaus David & Malcolm Thorburn
eds., 2016).
2. Id. at 223.
3. Id.
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countries followed the concept with variations in style and detail.4
Today, we witness the emergence of two main forms of judicial review:
the European model and the American model.5 Under the European
model, a centralized body ensures constitutionality of laws and
government acts and protects the fundamental rights of citizens.6 Under
the American model, the ordinary courts ensure constitutionality of bills
in the context of ongoing litigation.7 While the structure and authorities
vary from one country to another, states ensure the basic mechanisms,
such as review by third parties and the opportunity to request
constitutional review by more than one party, are in existence.
Historically, constitutional supremacy has been recognized in
nearly all constitutions of Afghanistan; however, a full-fledged judicial
review system has never emerged.8 Elements of judicial review
appeared in nearly all of the six short-lived constitutions of Afghanistan
in the twentieth century.9 The 2004 Constitution is not in any better
shape.10 Sixteen years since promulgation of Constitution of 2004, the
flaws and weaknesses of the inherited judicial review system are
exposed.11
The Afghanistan Supreme Court conducts judicial review at the
request of the government or the courts.12 However, the practice of
judicial review after 2004 has been inconsistent. A quick look at how
the Supreme Court is making judicial review and interpretation
decisions reveals that the only common element among those decisions
is inconsistency. While there is some clarity on the subject of
constitutional review and the role of the Supreme Court, the topic of
constitutional interpretation is more controversial. On one hand, the
Supreme Court has held that constitutional interpretation is a part of its
authority; however, on the other hand, some claim this authority can be
4. MAARTJE DE VISSER, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS (2014).
5. GHIZAAL HARESS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AFGHANISTAN: A FLAWED PRACTICE 5-6 (Afg.
Research & Evaluation Unit ed., 2017); Devashri Sinha, Constitutional Review: A Critical Study
of American Model and European Model, 2016 INDIAN L. INST. L. REV. 158, 158.
6. VISSER, supra note 4, at 95.
7. Margaret L. Moses, Beyond Judicial Activism: When the Supreme Court is No Longer a
Court, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 161, 163 (2011).
8. This article uses the terms “constitutional review” and “judicial review”
interchangeably. J. Alexander Thier, The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan, 51 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 558, 564 (2007).
9. HARESS, supra note 5, at 7-8.
10. Thier, supra note 8, at 579.
11. Id. at 572.
12. QANUN-I ASSASI-YE JAMHURI-YE ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF
AFGHANISTAN] of 2004 (Afg.) [hereinafter 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN].
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delegated to the Independent Commission for Overseeing
Implementation of the Constitution (“ICOIC”) because the Constitution
is not offering a clear viewpoint on this topic.13
This article gives a detailed account of the legal framework,
application, examples, and flaws of judicial review and constitutional
interpretation in Afghanistan and concludes that the current model of
judicial review is not responsive to the growing demands of the legal
sector and it is essential that judicial review undergo substantial
reforms. The following summarizes key recommendations of the article:
1. Given the importance of the subject matter, the reforms to
judicial review and constitutional interpretation should come
through a constitutional amendment process that clarifies the
role of each relevant entity in conducting judicial review.
2. One option is to make modifications in the existing Supreme
Court model. Setting forth a clear role for the Supreme Court
to interpret the Constitution, designing a separate mechanism
for judicial review of international treaties and government
regulations, and clarification on ensuring Sharia compliantlegislation are examples of the required modifications.
3. A more preferred option is to replace the current model of
constitutional review with the European model. The European
model would not only address the constitutionality of acts but
also address the constitutionality of the political questions
frequently raised in Afghanistan.
4. Until a revision of the constitutional review model takes
place through the marathon process of a constitutional
amendment, it is necessary that both the Supreme Court and
the ICOIC reach an agreement, followed by either an
introduction of new legislation or amendment of the existing
legislation, to bring some clarity on their roles and
responsibilities.
INTRODUCTION
In modern democracies, constitutions adhere to the principles of
separation of power and assign authorities to different branches of the
state accordingly. Even though division of authorities is mentioned
explicitly in most constitutions, the conflict between the branches
sometimes becomes unavoidable due to different interpretations of laws
and the constitution, which might result in one branch trespassing into
the territory of the other.
13. HARESS, supra note 5, at 14-16.
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Judicial review, or the authority to review the constitutionality of
legislation or governmental acts, is one of the features of modern
democratic governments. A theory of judicial review based on
separation of power requires the reviewing bodies to insist on adherence
to the principle of separation of powers whenever the government or
legislature seeks derogation of constitutional values. Therefore, judicial
review is based on the notion that the constitution is superior to the
other laws and administrative decisions. In addition, because
constitutions generally outline fundamental rights of citizens, judicial
review is considered a key factor in upholding the fundamental rights of
the citizens.
There are two main forms of judicial or constitutional review
practiced around the world.14 The United States first introduced the
decentralized model of judicial review.15 The landmark Marbury v.
Madison case in 1803 introduced the concept of judicial review and
supremacy of the United States Constitution at the federal level.16 Based
on the American model, the courts, at any level, can review the
constitutionality of acts when they decide cases before them.17 Under
this model, the judges are of high caliber and have a comprehensive
understanding of constitutional values and principles.
The European model, which is also known as the Kelsenian model,
named after its Austrian founder, is the other primary type of judicial
review.18 Under this model, one centralized body, like a court or council
that sits outside the judicial system, reviews the constitutionality of
laws.19 Though Hans Kelsen introduced this type of judicial review for
Austria, many countries around the world, such as Germany and Italy,
followed suit and applied this centralized type of judicial review.20
Based on the time the review is taking place, judicial review is
divided into priori review and posterior review.21 Priori review takes
place before the legislation is put into effect.22 For instance, if the
14. MARTIN M. SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND
JUDICIALIZATION (2002).
15. VISSER, supra note 4, at 94.
16. See Martin T. Manton, The Doctrine of Judicial Review, 8 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N BULL. 205,
207 (1936).
17. VISSER, supra note 4, at 94.
18. Id. at 95.
19. Id.
20. TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS
IN ASIAN CASES 9 (2003) (Ginsburg enlists a list of seventy-one new democracies out of which
forty-two have one type of constitutional review body in place).
21. VISSER, supra note 4, at 96.
22. Id.
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legislation passed by the parliament is reviewed before the final
signature, it is a form of priori review.23 On the other hand, if review is
only possible after the legislation is put into effect, it is called posterior
review.24 Scholars also categorize judicial review as abstract review,
concrete review, or individual challenge based on the nature and type of
review.25 If the reviewing body conducts the review without
consideration of litigation, it is called abstract review.26 Concrete review
takes place as part of ongoing litigation.27 In some countries, individuals
can also file a request in which they challenge the constitutionality of a
government act or legislation.28
This article examines whether Afghanistan has followed the
American or the European model of judicial review and whether
judicial review has been successful. The article begins by looking at the
history of judicial review in Afghanistan and then examines the
application of judicial review and its challenges under the Afghan
Constitution of 2004. This article also explores the subject of
constitutional interpretation and the reasons it has been portrayed as a
controversial matter in recent years. Based on the lessons learned after
2004, the author provides his recommendations on enhancement of the
judicial review in Afghanistan.
I. PART ONE: HISTORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AFGHANISTAN
A. Judicial Review Before 2004
Abdul Rahman Khan (1880-1901) was the first ruler of
Afghanistan to initiate the establishment of modern state courts beside
Sharia courts.29 For the most part between the 1880s and 1960s,
Afghanistan continued the tradition of having a dual court system:
Sharia courts handled matters like criminal law, family law and personal
law, and the state courts decided matters like tax, commerce, and civil
service.30 Afghanistan did not have a constitution or recognize the
23. Id.
24. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 131 (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel
Kelemen & Gregory A. Calderia eds., 2008).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Ramin Moschtaghi, Organization and Jurisdiction of Newly Established Afghan Courts
– The Compliance of the Formal System of Justice with the Bonn Agreement, 10 MAX PLANCK
Y.B. U.N. L. 531 (2006), http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf3/mpunyb_12_ramin.pdf.
30. J. Alexander Thier, Reestablishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan 5 (Ctr. on
Democracy, Dev., and Rule of Law, Stanford Inst. for Int’l Studies, Working Paper No. 19,
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concept of separation of powers until achieving independence in 1919.31
Abdul Rahman Khan and his successor, Habibullah Khan, relied on
their own creeds and decrees to run the country.32
After the 1919 Independence War, King Amanullah introduced the
first Constitution of Afghanistan in 1923.33 That Constitution did not
foresee the establishment of a parliament.34 Following the examples of
France and Egypt, the 1923 Constitution established a Council of State
that had two main duties: first, to review the text of laws before the
Council of Ministers approve them; and second, to act as the Higher
Court for civil service disputes.35 The 1923 Constitution also authorized
the Council of State to explain and interpret any article of the
Constitution or other laws followed by the approval of the Council of
Ministers.36 There is no evidence, however, that indicates the Council of
State exercised this power. Though the main purpose of review of laws
by the State Council was to improve the quality of laws, the process
could be seen as a semi-priori review of laws against the Constitution.
The constitutions that came into existence after the 1923 Constitution
possessed some elements of judicial review, but none introduced a
robust mechanism.
The 1931 Constitution that created a legislature for the first time
lacked any reference to judicial review except for containing a
repugnancy clause. Article 65 stated that legislative documents adopted
by the National Assembly shall not be repugnant to principles of Islam
or the policy of the government;37 however, it failed to mention any
mechanism for ensuring adherence to the repugnancy clause.38 Given
the advisory role of the National Assembly, it was not a surprise that
such a mechanism was lacking. The first two constitutions of
Afghanistan were weak documents that did not clearly define the
structure of the state and separation of power.39 A real legislative branch
2004),
https://www.fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/Reestablishing_the_
Judiciary_in_Afghanistan.pdf.
31. Constitutional History of Afghanistan, ENCYCLOPAEDIA IRANICA, http://www.
iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-history-of-afghanistan (last visited Oct. 11, 2018).
32. Moschtaghi, supra note 29.
33. Id.
34. Constitutional History of Afghanistan, supra note 31.
35. SARWAR DANISH, HUQOQ EDRAI AFGHANISTAN [THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF
AFGHANISTAN] (Kabul: Ibn Sina Higher Education Institute Publications, 2013).
36. NEZAMNAMEH-I ASSASI-YE DAWLAT ALIAH AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF
AFGHANISTAN] of 1923 (Afg.) [hereinafter 1923 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN].
37. OSOUL-I ASSASI-YE DAWLAT-I ALIAH AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF
AFGHANISTAN] of 1931 (Afg.) Art. 65 [hereinafter 1931 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN].
38. Id.
39. HARESS, supra note 5, at 7.
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was not in place to create legislation that could be repugnant to the
Constitution or Sharia and thus there was no possibility of conflict
between the legislative and executive branch.
By 1963, King Zahir Shah (1933-1973) began his reform plan in
order to democratize the country by establishing separation of branches
and decreasing the power of the Monarch and the Royal Family.40 For
the first time, the 1964 Constitution—considered as the finest
constitution of the Muslim world at the time of its introduction41—
declared the judiciary an “independent organ of the State which charges
its duties side by side with the Legislative and Executive Organs.”42 In
addition, a consolidated and unified judicial system, at the top of which
was the Supreme Court, took its place in the Constitution.43 The
Constitution and the laws were also declared as the dominant sources
for decision-making in the courts, and Sharia law (Hanafi School of
Jurisprudence) could be applied only if a rule was not found in the
Constitution or in the ordinary laws.44 Recognized as an independent
organ, the judiciary was the real winner of the 1964 Constitution. The
current structure of the judiciary resembles the same structure that the
1964 Constitution introduced.
The 1964 Constitution tagged the King as the guardian of the
Constitution.45 It also contained a repugnancy clause stating that no law
shall be against the principles of Islam or other values enshrined in the
Constitution.46 The 1964 Constitution, however, did not have a clear
reference to a judicial review mechanism. To fill in the gap, the 1967
Law of Jurisdiction and Organization of the Courts provided that the
Supreme Court has the power to abstain from applying laws repugnant
to the provisions of the Constitution and to interpret laws at the time of
implementation.47 Interviews and research,48 however, show that the
Supreme Court failed to exercise a single case of judicial review.49
40. Reestablishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan, supra note 30, at 5.
41. LOUIS DUPREE, AFGHANISTAN 565 (3d ed. 1980).
42. QANUN-I ASSASI-YE JAMHURI-YE ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF
AFGHANISTAN] of 1964 (Afg.) art. 97 [hereinafter 1964 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN].
43. Reestablishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan, supra note 30, at 10.
44. 1964 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 42, at art. 102.
45. Id. at art. 7.
46. Id. at art. 64.
47. Afghanistan Law of the Jurisdiction and Organization of the Courts, AFGHANISTAN
OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 89, Art. 13.a. 1-2 (1967) (Afg.) [hereinafter 1967 Afghanistan Law of the
Courts].
48. Interview with Mohammad Sediq Zhobl, Directorate Gen. of Scrutiny and Perusal,
Supreme Court (Jan. 10, 2018) (on file with author).
49. See generally Martin Lau, Islamic Law and the Afghan Legal System (May 30, 2003),
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The 1976 Constitution that was ratified during the first Republic
also had a repugnancy clause.50 Article 135 gave the authority of
interpretation of the Constitution to the Supreme Court.51 However,
before the President established the Supreme Court, the communists’
coup in 1978 changed the regime. The new regime set aside the
Constitution and started ruling the country by decrees until a new
Constitution was introduced in 1980.52 The first constitution of the
Communist Regime authorized the Executive Board of the
Revolutionary Council to interpret the law but it lacked a clause
allowing judicial review.53
It was not until 1987 that a constitution in Afghanistan
incorporated different aspects of constitutional review.54 In addition to a
repugnancy clause that stated that no law shall be against the principles
of Islam or other values enshrined in the Constitution,55 the 1987
Constitution introduced a French-style model of judicial review. This
was the first time an Afghan constitution introduced a robust, but still
flawed, mechanism for review of legislation. Chapter Ten of the 1987
Constitution was devoted to the Constitutional Council.56
The Constitutional Council was composed of a chairperson and
eight members.57 The President appointed the members for a term of six
years.58 The amendments to the Constitution in 1990 changed the
composition of the Constitutional Council by adding deputy and
secretary positions, increasing the number of Council members to
eleven.59 The Council was accountable to the President and was obliged
to report to him.60 The role of the President in appointing the council
members and accountability of the Council to the President clearly
negated any claim of independence of the Council. Thus, the Council
https://www.eprints.lse.ac.uk/28366/1/Lau_LSERO_version.pdf, (unpublished conference paper)
(on file with London School of Economics Research Online).
50. QANUN-I ASSASI-YE DAWLAT-I JAMHURI-YE AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF
AFGHANISTAN] of 1976 (Afg.) art. 64 [hereinafter 1976 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN].
51. Id. at art. 135.
52. Constitutional History of Afghanistan, supra note 31.
53. OSOUL-I ASSASI-YE JAMHURI-YE DEMOCRATIC AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF
AFGHANISTAN] of 1980 (Afg.) [hereinafter 1980 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN].
54. Constitutional History of Afghanistan, supra note 31.
55. QANUN-I ASSASI-YE JAMHURI-YE AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN] of
1987 (Afg.) [hereinafter 1987 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN].
56. Id. at art. 125.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. QANUN-I ASSASI-YE JAMHURI-YE AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN] of
1990 (Afg.) [hereinafter 1990 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN].
60. 1987 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 55, at art. 126.
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had only an advisory role. This was proof that the Constitution only
copied the physical features of the French model of judicial review. The
entity lacked the independence exercised by similar entities in the
democratic world.
Putting aside the critics, the main objective of the establishment of
the Council was to ensure the constitutionality of laws, legislative
documents, and international treaties.61 In addition, the Constitutional
Council had a duty to provide legal and judicial opinions to the
President on matters related to implementation of the Constitution.62
The Council could also share its recommendations on effective
execution of legislative documents prescribed by the Constitution with
the President.63 The Council had a long list of duties; however, due to
the advisory nature of its decisions, it lacked the power to overturn
unconstitutional documents. As per Article 124 of the 1987
Constitution, the Constitutional Council had a priori review authority.64
This Article and the text of Constitutional Council Law reveal that the
ruling of the Council on such matters was advisory in nature and it was
up to the President to consider or ignore the Council’s opinions.65
The Council also had the authority for posteriori review of the
legislative documents at the request of rights protecting entities, other
state institutions, and individuals.66 It was required that organizations
and individuals share their questions with the Constitutional Council
and if the Council agreed with the unconstitutionality of the legislative
document, the Council would send its proposal for abolishment of the
legislative document to the President.67 Despite its lack of authority in
enforcing its opinions, the range of institutions and accessibility of
individuals to the Constitutional Council was revolutionary.
The records of the Ministry of Justice show that the Constitutional
Council issued fifty-six opinions on different legislative documents.68
Out of those cases, the Constitutional Council announced
constitutionality of forty-two of the legislative documents, declared
twelve of the legislative documents unconstitutional, and the Council

61. Id. at art. 122.
62. Id. at art. 123.
63. Id. at art. 124.
64. Id.
65. Law on Constitutional Council, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 682, art. 12
(1988) (Afg.).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. OFFICIAL GAZETTE, (last visited Oct. 11, 2018) (Afg.).
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provided its opinion as a commentary on two other subjects.69 The
opinions of the Council included a variety of subjects that came from
different entities, groups, and even individuals.70 While the Constitution
required a party to ask for review of the constitutionality of legislative
documents, the Constitutional Council, without being asked, provided
an opinion defining the term “urgent need” for approval of a legislative
decree by the government during the recess of the National Assembly.71
This was an indication that the Council wanted to take initiative and
expand its jurisdiction beyond what the Constitution and the Council’s
Law had mandated.
In one of its first decisions, the Constitutional Council announced
that a number of articles of the Law on National Assembly were
unconstitutional.72 The relevant unconstitutional articles restricted
candidacy for leadership positions in the two houses of the National
Assembly to only candidates of political parties. In addition, the
Council stated that articles of the Law on the following subjects are
unconstitutional: (1) the requirement of two-thirds majority vote to hold
a non-public session of the National Assembly, (2) declaring opinions
of the Senate over the national budget as advisory, and (3) expansion of
the oversight authority of the National Assembly over the judiciary.73
The Council shared the opinion with the President, who returned the
law back to the National Assembly, based on that opinion.74 Another
case concerns the decision of the Council of Ministers for waiving taxrelated penalties. The Constitutional Council rejected the decision,
calling it unconstitutional since only the President had such an authority
according to the Constitution.75 There has also been one request from an
employee of the Supreme Court who believed Article 32 of the Civil
Servants Law on implementation of illegal orders of their supervisors is
violating Article 42 of the Constitution, which asks for implementation
of orders of the senior officials.76 The concerned individual did not send
the request directly to the Council; rather, he shared his request with the
High Council of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court sent the

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Constitutional Council Opinion, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 682 (1989)
(Afg.) [hereinafter 1989 Constitutional Council Opinion].
72. See id.
73. Id. at 11.
74. Id. at 26.
75. Id. at 16-17.
76. Id. at 18-20.
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request to the Constitutional Council.77 Ultimately, the Constitutional
Council struck down the request and declared the relevant article of the
Civil Servants Law as constitutional.78 The Constitutional Council also
faced a question concerning Sharia. In 1988, the Women's Association
of Afghanistan requested the Constitutional Council to declare a number
of articles of the Civil Code related to divorce unconstitutional since
those articles undermined the equality of men and women, a principle
recognized under Article 38 of the Constitution.79 The Constitutional
Council, after explaining how men and women could apply for divorce
under the Civil Code, which is based on Sharia, rejected the request.80
Though the Constitutional Council reviewed a considerable
number of laws, the biggest flaw was the advisory role of the Council
and its inability to enforce its findings.81 Therefore, the impact of this
short-lived Council was minimal, and the safeguards against violation
of the Constitution were weak and ignorable.
It is worth mentioning that while the Constitutional Council had
the power of constitutional review, the Constitution had authorized the
National Assembly to interpret the ordinary laws.82 This was not
strange, at least in the region. In Iran, the Guardian Council of the
Constitution ensures compliance of legislation with Sharia and
Constitution,83 while the parliament interprets its own passed-laws.84
The Taliban regime did not have a constitution or they did not
introduce it publicly, and they did not announce the abolishment of
previous constitutions either. However, in a rather interesting action, the
Taliban slightly revised the previously enforced Constitutional Council
Law and published the law in the Official Gazette.85 The so-called
Constitutional Council of the Taliban was supposed to work under the
auspices of the Administrative Office of the Taliban Government.86
Article 2 of that law authorized the Constitutional Council to ensure
77. Id. at 20.
78. Constitutional Council Opinion, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 763 (1992)
(Afg.) [hereinafter 1992 Constitutional Council Opinion].
79. 1989 Constitutional Council Opinion at 31.
80. Id.
81. Lau, supra note 49 (manuscript at 219).
82. 1987 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 54.
83. QANUNI ASSASI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1979 art. 91 [hereinafter 1979 CONSTITUTION OF IRAN].
84. Id. at art. 73.
85. Law on Constitutional Council, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 797 (2001)
(Afg.).
86. Law on Constitutional Council (Taliban Regime), AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE
No. 797 (2001) (Afg.).
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compatibility of laws, other legislative documents and international
treaties with Sharia.87 It is unknown whether the Constitutional Council
was ever established or reviewed any legislative document for its
compatibility with Sharia. Interviews with individuals who are familiar
with the institutions at the time of the Taliban indicate that only one
individual, Mohammad Musa Nohmat, who had been a member of the
Constitutional Council before the collapse of the communist regime,
continued to have his previous title at the time of the Taliban regime,
though he did not have any authority.88
The review of previous Afghan Constitutions reveals that a fullfledged system of constitutional review was never in place.89 At times,
there were elements of a Supreme Court model of judicial review
introduced like the one under the 1976 Constitution of Daud Khan. On
the other hand, the 1987 Constitution established a constitutional
council similar to that of France. However, unlike its French
counterpart, Afghanistan’s Constitutional Council had a shorter
lifespan, was not independent, and was dysfunctional due to the
collapse of the regime.90
B. Judicial Review Under the 2004 Constitution
Compared to previous constitutions of Afghanistan, the
Constitution of 2004 has recognized a vast range of fundamental rights
and liberties and it has tried to create a government of separation of
power. The Judiciary is an independent organ of the State and has three
tiers of courts: primary courts, appeals courts, and the Supreme Court as
the highest organ of the judiciary.91 The legislature has extensive power
and is mandated to oversee the Executive using different means. To
summarize, this Constitution designs a system of checks and balances
that creates an unprecedented democratic system of governance.
While the 1987 Constitution had introduced a constitutional review
mechanism similar to that of France, the 2004 Constitution derogates
from that tradition. The 2004 Constitution gives the Supreme Court the
power to ensure conformity of the laws, legislative decrees, inter-state
treaties as well as international covenants with the Constitution and
their interpretation.92 There are limitations on who and what entities can
87. Id. at 11.
88. Interview with Mohammada Gul Koochay, Dir. of Monitoring, Office of Chief of Staff
to the President (Jan. 3, 2018) (on file with author).
89. HARESS, supra note 5, at 10.
90. Constitutional History of Afghanistan, supra note 31.
91. 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 116.
92. Id. at art. 121.
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ask for a review of constitutionality. Article 121 only authorizes the
government and the courts to submit requests for constitutional
review.93 Besides, the Constitution requires passage of a law that will
regulate the practical details of the judicial review and interpretation.94
This law is yet to be introduced, though some aspects of judicial review
and interpretation are addressed in the new draft Law of Organization
and Jurisdiction of the Judiciary.95
During the 2004 Constitutional Loya Jirga, judicial review
appeared to be a contentious issue.96 The Constitutional Drafting
Commission had suggested a Constitutional Court be established to
ensure conformity of laws and other legislative decrees with the
constitution.97 The draft Constitution had outlined the judicial review
and authority to conduct interpretation of the Constitution and other
legislative decrees quite clearly.98 The following text is an excerpt from
Chapter 8 of the Draft Constitution:
Chapter Eight—Draft Constitution of Afghanistan
Article 141: The Supreme Constitutional Court of Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan, in accordance with the provisions of
this chapter, shall supervise the compliance of laws with the
Constitution.
Article 142: The Supreme Constitutional Court shall consist of
6 members, appointed by the President and approved by
Mishrano Jirga [the Upper House] for one term of 9 years. The
President shall appoint one member as the Head. The
organization and authorities of the Supreme Constitutional
Court shall be regulated by law.
Article 143: Member of the Supreme Constitutional Court shall
have the following qualifications:
1. Be a citizen of Afghanistan and shall not hold citizenship of
another country.
2. Shall have higher education in law or [Islamic]
jurisprudence.
93. 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 121.
94. Id.
95. Draft Law on Jurisdiction and Organization of the Judiciary, (2018) (Afg.) (on file with
author).
96. Shamshad Pasarlay, Constitutional Interpretation and Constitutional Review in
Afghanistan: Is There Still a Crisis?, I-CONNECT: BLOG (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.
iconnectblog.com/2015/03/constitutional-interpretation-and-constitutional-review-in-afghanistanis-there-still-a-crisis/.
97. Id.
98. Thier, supra note 8, at 579.
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3. Shall have minimum ten years of legal, judicial, or
legislative experience.
4. Shall have completed 40 years of age.
5. Shall not have been convicted of crimes against humanity,
felony, or deprivation of civil rights.
Article 144: The Supreme Constitutional Court shall have the
following authorities:
1. Review of laws, legislative decrees, inter-state treaties, and
international covenants for their compliance with the
constitution.
2. Interpretation of the Constitution, laws, and legislative
decrees.
Article 145: In considering a case, if one of the courts
ascertains that the provision of the law applicable to the case,
is contrary to the Constitution, the court shall suspend the case
and refer the matter to the Supreme Constitutional Court.
This provision is also applicable if one of the parties to the
case claims such contradictions, provided that it is approved by
the court.
In case the Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan finds a
provision of the law incompatible with the fundamental rights
enshrined in this constitution, it can refer the matter to the
Supreme Constitutional Court.
Article 146: Legislative documents found contrary to the
Constitution, by the Supreme Constitutional Court, are void.
The ruling of the Supreme Constitutional Court is final and not
subject to review, [and] is enforced once published in the
official gazette.99
This chapter provided a clear definition and mechanism for
judicial review and interpretation. It also provided a clear path for
courts and individuals to challenge the constitutionality of various
legislative documents.
Once the Draft Constitution was submitted for review to Hamid
Karzai, the then Head of the Transitional Government, he and his
cabinet did not agree with the establishment of an independent court to
ensure constitutionality.100 Some argue that Hamid Karzai was afraid of
a possible tension between the branches and the possible limitation a
Constitutional Court could impose on the next President of the country.
99. SARWAR DANISH, HUQUQ-I ASSAS-I AFGHANISTAN [AFGHANISTAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW] (Kabul: Ibn-e-Sina Institute of Higher Education, 3rd ed. 2015) (on file with author).
100. Pasarlay, supra note 96.
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Others argue he was advised not to accept that institution since it might
function like the Guardian Council of Iran, which frequently limits the
power of the executive and legislature.101
In the Draft Constitution that was published in late 2003 and
distributed to Constitutional Loya Jirga for discussion and approval, the
authority of judicial review, in its initial form, was scrapped and was
awarded to the Supreme Court. Article 121 of the Draft Constitution
distributed to Constitutional Loya Jirga members reads as follows: “At
the request of only the Government or the courts, the Supreme Court
reviews compliance of laws, legislative decrees, inter-state treaties and
international covenants with the Constitution and issues the necessary
verdicts. Supreme Court is authorized to interpret the Constitution, laws
and legislative decrees.”102
In contrast to the proposed model of the Constitutional Drafting
Commission, Article 121 was very brief and insufficient. However,
despite being brief, Article 121 separated the subject of judicial review
from the subject of interpretation. Few changes made to this Article in
the Constitutional Loya Jirga, with the objective to keep the Article
precise, proved to be a trigger for the controversy between the three
branches of the state in the upcoming years. Article 121 of the
Constitution as approved in Loya Jirga reads as follows: “At the request
of the Government or courts, the Supreme Court shall review the laws,
legislative decrees, inter-state treaties as well as international covenants
for their compliance with the Constitution and their interpretation in
accordance with the law.”103
Compromise on the last day of Loya Jirga resulted in the
introduction of Article 157 and the establishment of the ICOIC.104
Though it looked like a positive step for ensuring full and timely
implementation of the Constitution, later incidents proved a
constitutional crisis was in the making due to the vagueness of Articles
121 and 157.

101. Barnett R. Rubin, Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan, 15 J. OF DEM. 1, 15 (2004).
102. Stera Mahkama Afghanistan [Supreme Court of Afghanistan] Qarari Qazai Shomara 5
Stara Mahkama-Ye Afghanistan Raji ba Adam Motabiqat-I Mawad-I Qanun-I Kamison-I
Mostaqil-I Nizarat bar Tatbiq-I Qanun Assasi ba Qanun Assasi [Opinion No. 5 on the
Unconstitutionality of Law of the Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of
the Constitution], AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE NO. 986 (2009) (Afg.).
103. 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 121.
104. HARESS, supra note 5, at 11.
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II. PART TWO: KEY FEATURES AND APPLICABILITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
UNDER THE 2004 CONSTITUTION
Legal systems usually follow either a centralized or decentralized
model of judicial review. However, judicial review under each legal
system has its own features. Constitutions, laws, relevant procedures,
bylaws and precedents highlight these features. The following two subparts discuss the basic features of judicial review in Afghanistan and the
key judicial review decisions made so far on constitutionality of the
bills passed by the National Assembly. As discussed earlier, the
language of the Constitution is very brief on the issue of judicial review
and interpretation, and the law is not in place to regulate its mechanism.
To understand the key features, we have to rely heavily on the decisions
made by the Supreme Court so far.
A. Key Features of Judicial Review Under the 2004 Constitution
The Constitution requires passage of a law to enable the Supreme
Court in its judicial review and interpretation tasks.105 However, the
Supreme Court has not submitted a draft law to regulate the subject of
the judicial review yet. In the absence of such regulating legislation, the
Supreme Court has thus far acted inconsistently in accepting requests
and deciding judicial review cases. The following paragraphs elaborate
some aspects of judicial review based on the practice of the Supreme
Court in recent years.
1. Request Mechanisms
According to Article 121, the Supreme Court can only receive
requests for judicial review and interpretation from the government and
the courts based on law.106 Therefore, the range of institutions that can
challenge the constitutionality of legislative documents is limited.
a. From the Government
The government, as described by the Constitution, “shall be
comprised of the Ministers who work under the chairmanship of the
President.”107 A simple interpretation of this clause is that whenever the
President, any minister, or heads of any other government agency want
to trigger Article 121, they must call a meeting of the cabinet. Only after
the cabinet’s approval can the official ask the Supreme Court for
105. See 2004 CONSTITUTION OFAFGHANISTAN.
106. Id.
107. Id. at art. 71.
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constitutional review or interpretation. In practice, however, the
government has taken different approaches in asking the Supreme Court
for judicial review. In many cases, the Office of Administrative Affairs
of the President has sent official letters, on behalf of the President, to
the Supreme Court asking for a review of the conformity of certain laws
with the Constitution.108 In a few cases, the President has held a meeting
of the cabinet, and after the approval of the cabinet, the Administrative
Office of the President has sent official letters to the Supreme Court.109
On only one occasion did the Supreme Court reject requests made by
the Administrative Office of the President for interpretation of Higher
Education Law and asked that the request first be approved by the
cabinet of ministers.110
While on most occasions, the Administrative Office of the
President officially asked the Supreme Court to review the conformity
of laws, on a few other occasions, the cabinet assigned other institutions
to ask the Supreme Court to make such a request. For instance, in 2016,
the cabinet assigned the Ministry of Education to work with the
Afghanistan Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service
Commission to increase the number of women in decision-making
positions. The Ministry of Education submitted its proposal; however,
the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission
argued the decision contradicted the Labor Law and Civil Service Law,
which bars the dismissal of current employees without legal
justification. On November 6, 2016, the President asked the
Independent Administrative Reforms and Civil Service Commission to
either work based on Article 44 of the Constitution or ask the Supreme
Court to interpret the extent to which the cabinet has authority to create
a developed and balanced society.111
On another occasion, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent an
official letter to the Supreme Court and asked for a review of the
constitutionality of the Law on Diplomatic and Consular Employees.112It
is not known whether they had the authority of the cabinet or the
President to make such a request. While the Supreme Court accepted
108. Letter from Admin. Office of the President to Supreme Court (n.d.) (on file with author).
109. Id.
110. Letter from Supreme Court to Admin. Office of the President (n.d.) (on file with author).
111. The author was given responsibility to follow up implementation of the presidential
instruction to the relevant agency.
112. See generally Stera Mahkama Afghanistan [Supreme Court of Afghanistan] Ruling No.
20 Regarding Lack of Compliance of Article 5(1) and Article 8 of the Law on Diplomatic and
Consular Employees with the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, AFGHANISTAN
OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 1114 (2013) (Afg.).*
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the request from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it rejected a request
made by an individual minister after his impeachment by Wolsi Jirga.113
In the famous case of Mujtaba Patang, he asked the Supreme Court to
clarify whether his dismissal by Wolsi Jirga was a constitutional
decision.114 The Supreme Court did not accept the request citing lack of
authority of the impeached minister to forward such a request.115
Overall, the practice of acceptance of requests by the Supreme Court
shows inconsistency in dealing with the requests from the government.
Government agencies have varied in their approaches, and while the
Supreme Court has objected on a few occasions, it has accepted on
others.
b. From the Courts
Article 121 also allows the courts to make requests for judicial
review and interpretation.116 However, a clear procedure has never been
put in place. For many years, it was believed the Supreme Court did not
receive requests on judicial review or interpretation through the
courts.117 Interviews with Supreme Court officials and a closer look at
Supreme Court publications reveal that such requests are made on a
number of occasions.118
Until 2013, it was doubtful whether lower courts were able to stop
court proceedings if they realized there was a need for interpretation of
the law. The current Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of Judiciary
prescribes that if during court proceedings, the court determines that
deciding the case before the court needs interpretation of the law, the
court stops the proceedings and refer the case to the High Council of the
Supreme Court.119 This Article is unfortunately unclear on whether the
primary courts are able to refer the case directly to the Supreme Court
or they should refer them to the Appellate Court first. Furthermore, it is
not known whether the question from the lower court can be also about
compliance of laws with the Constitution or interpretation of the
Constitution, international treaties and legislative decrees as outlined in
Article 121 of the Constitution. In addition to lack of a clear procedure
for the courts to pose judicial review questions to the Supreme Court, a
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

HARESS, supra note 5, at 23.
Id.
Id.
2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 121.
HARESS, supra note 5, at 20.
Interview with Mohammad Sediq Zhobl, supra note 48 (on file with author).
Afghanistan Law of Organization and Jurisdiction of the Judiciary, AFGHANISTAN
OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 1109, Art. 30 (2013) (Afg.).
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lack of capacity in the lower courts on constitutional matters can be the
other key reason for lack of referral of judicial review questions by the
lower courts.
The lower courts have yet to ask the Supreme Court questions as
part of concrete review. However, they do make their abstract questions
to the Supreme Court when they need guidance or when they are unsure
of the meaning of a law or when they believe a particular article of the
law does not conform to the Constitution. Historically, the Supreme
Court has received requests for estihda, which literally translates as
“request for guidance,” from the lower courts and other institutions such
as ministries. After adoption of the 2004 Constitution, some of these
requests by the lower courts concerned subjects of Article 121 of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court organizes regular seminars in which
the Heads of Appellate Courts and members of the Supreme Court
participate. After discussing each estihda, members provide written
answers to those questions. The Supreme Court subsequently publishes
the responses to the questions in a collection series.
There are many examples of court requests, a few of which are
discussed here. For instance, the Provincial Appellate Court of Sar-i-Pul
wrote to the Supreme Court that Articles 32 and 37 of the Law on
Criminal Procedures that regulate the search of houses is not in
conformity with Article 38 of the Constitution.120 The Supreme Court in
a one-paragraph response explained the differences and concluded that
there is no contradiction between those two articles and the
Constitution.121 The same court, in a separate request, wrote that clause
4 of Article 53 of the Interim Criminal Procedures is not in conformity
with Article 134 of the Constitution and the word “investigation” should
be replaced with “detection.”122 The Supreme Court rejected the request
and argued there is no contradiction.123 These examples demonstrate the
questions of constitutionality the courts face; however, they do not
make the questions a part of specific cases. Instead, they continue the
old way of asking for estihda.
An interesting aspect of Afghanistan judicial review is whether the
Constitution of 2004 or practice of courts established the innovative
approach of letting the courts make requests on “abstract review” from

120. SUPREME COURT OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, DOCUMENTS AND
DECISIONS (Kabul: Supreme Court of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2007) (on file with
author).
121. Id. (on file with author).
122. Id. (on file with author).
123. Id. at 109 (on file with author).
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the Supreme Court. Constitutional review mechanisms around the world
do not allow requests for abstract review by the courts. Only in Spain,
does the mechanism have some similarity to practices in Afghanistan.
Under section 163 of the Spanish Constitution, when hearing a case, if
an ordinary court considers a government act unconstitutional, it may
bring the matter to the Constitutional Court for review of its
constitutionality.124 In those circumstances, if the issue of the law’s
constitutionality has ‘relevance’ to the case, the Constitutional Court
may make a decision for nullification of the law and subsequently, the
referring court may make a decision regarding the case based on the
ruling of the Constitutional Court.125 In practice, however, the lower
courts do not wait for the final ruling of the Constitutional Court.
Therefore, when the ruling of the Constitutional Court is announced, it
seems like an ‘abstract review' of the question. The practice of estihda is
very similar to this procedure. While we have not experienced ‘concrete
review’ cases yet, the practice of ordinary courts and the response of the
Supreme Court illustrate an ‘abstract review’ in response to requests of
the courts. The inability of the lower courts to make an appropriate
analysis of constitutional law questions is a key factor in their
unwillingness to operationalize concrete review. Instead, those courts
forward the questions to the Supreme Court, so the Supreme Court
response helps them with similar cases in the future. This practice of
forwarding constitutional review matters to the Supreme Court is not an
ideal mechanism since concrete review is a tool for individuals to
challenge legislation that contradict their fundamental rights. An
abstract review request by the ordinary courts takes away this
opportunity from the individuals.
The limitation on the number of entities that can request judicial
review has worked in the government’s favor. This has sparked
criticism that the Supreme Court is accepting political requests. The
political question doctrine is based on the notion that courts should
abstain from deciding those constitutional matters that fall under the
jurisdiction of political branches of the state.126 The Supreme Court has
not rejected any case for its non-justiciability so far, though there are
opinions that the case of Mujtaba Patang was not justiciable.127 While
124. CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n. 163, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).
125. Enrique Guillen Lopez, Judicial Review in Spain: The Constitutional Court, 41 Lᴏʏ.
L.A. L. Rᴇᴠ. 529, 546 (2008).
126. Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J.
1457, 1458 (2005).
127. Interview with Ghizaal Haress, Member of Indep. Commission for Overseeing
Implementation of the Constitution (Feb. 8, 2018) (on file with author).

FINAL_FOR_JCI

2019]

5/19/2020 5:45 AM

Constitutional Interpretation in Afghanistan

243

the Supreme Court accepted and decided the impeachment case of
Minister Spanta, perhaps a political matter,128 it did not give a response
to the government when Wolesi Jirga impeached seven ministers in
2016, presumably for political reasons. The Supreme Court’s lack of
response can possibly indicate that it considers the case to be nonjusticiable, though influence from the executive branch on the Supreme
Court to avoid issuing an unfavorable decision cannot be overruled. It is
necessary for the Supreme Court to clearly spell out its stance on
political matters. A clear stance by the Supreme Court sets the
precedent and prevents referral of political question in the future.
Under the American model of judicial review, courts are barred
from hearing political claims.129 In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court of
the United States defined political question and ruled that the courts
cannot decide those cases.130 The relevant part of the decision reads:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.131
In contrast to the American model of judicial review, adjudicating
political matters is not a strange practice under the European model.132
Hans Kelsen, the founder of the theory, acknowledges the role of the
political decisions in such structures.133 According to Kelsen, since
courts do not enter the political arena, it is up to a political organization
to make such decisions.134 There are also examples of High Courts that
hear cases of a political nature, but those courts possess clear
128. HARESS, supra note 5, at 22.
129. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 49-53 (5th
ed., 2015).
130. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
131. Id.
132. Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Building Reputation in Constitutional Courts: Political
and Judicial Audiences, 28 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 539, 556-58 (2011).
133. LARS VINX, HANS KELSEN’S PURE THEORY OF LAW: LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 1,
145 (2007).
134. Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 132, at 548-49.
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constitutional authority.135 For example, the High Court of the Greek
Cypriot State has jurisdiction to hear cases in connection with conflicts,
contests of power, or competence arising between the House of
Representatives and any other organ of the state.136 These are of course
political questions; however, the articles of the Constitution of Cyprus
are elaborate and one cannot contest the legitimacy of the power of the
High Court which has the final decision making authority in regard to
decisions coming from the inferior courts.137 Meanwhile, the 2004
Afghan Constitution mandates that any dispute arising between parties,
including the state, should be submitted to the courts for adjudication.138
Does that mean political questions can be filed in the Supreme Court?
It makes sense that a majority of judicial review requests have
come from the government considering that the Afghan government and
courts have the exclusive right to make such requests. Moreover, it is
also logical that individual citizens do not make requests for judicial
review directly to the Supreme Court considering that they are not
specifically conferred that right under Article 121 of the Constitution.
One assumption is that if individual litigants realize that the legislation
that concerns their disputes is potentially unconstitutional, they will ask
the ordinary court to request the Supreme Court to engage in judicial
review. Ideally and as the law vaguely requires, the ordinary court
should stop the proceedings, send the question up to the Supreme Court
to ensure conformity of the legislation with the Constitution, and
resume the case once the Supreme Court issues a verdict. This has not
happened yet.139 Instead, ordinary courts send their abstract questions to
the Supreme Court.140 This may be because they are unfamiliar with the
system and ordinary courts are not ready to hear such cases: it was as if
such requests by the citizens never existed. Difficulty to file cases of
judicial review to the Supreme Court through lower courts might justify
why the majority of Supreme Court decisions favor the government.
To summarize, the requests by the Government are under ‘abstract
review,’ while the requests by courts are supposed to be done under
‘concrete review.’ Nevertheless, the courts have filed their requests
under the ‘abstract review’ mechanism and have not considered the
constitutionality of the matters as part of an ongoing dispute. ‘Concrete
review’ is yet to be practiced in Afghanistan.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Miscellaneous Provisions of 1964, Admin. of Justice Pub. L. No. 33-04 (Cyprus).
Id.
VISSER, supra note 4, at 95.
2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 120.
HARESS, supra note 5, at 20.
Id.
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2. Time It Takes to Issue a Verdict
In the absence of the required legislation, the Supreme Court has
not established any timeline for discussions and timelines for issuing a
verdict.141 The timeline for each case varies and has ranged from
thirteen days to many months. When the Court reviewed the
constitutionality of the ICOIC Law and Media Law, it took almost
seven and a half months.142 The judicial review of the Law on
Diplomatic and Consular Employees took thirteen days.143 Lack of a
clear timeline has branded Supreme Court judicial review as an
unpredictable process.
3. Bench that Decides
The nine members of the Supreme Court are divided into five
divisions or diwans. If parties to the case challenge a decision of an
appellate court, or legislation requires a mandatory decision in the
Supreme Court, each diwan has the authority to make a decision based
on their subject-matter jurisdiction. On the contrary, the High Council
of the Supreme Court, which consists of all nine justices, must review
requests made under Article 121 of the Constitution.144 The Council
meetings are held every fifteen days, or as deemed necessary.145 In
ordinary cases, it is possible for a bench member to attach his dissent;
however, no member of the Supreme Court has published a dissent on
judicial review or interpretation issues.
Constitutional issues are intricate and therefore a consensus of the
bench members is not always expected. Dissent is a normal practice.
Individual Supreme Court members can see lack of dissent in judicial
review decisions as a sign of lack of independence. In addition, it raises
the question whether the members are afraid of being politically
questioned for their opinions.
4. Procedures
The Supreme Court has not issued any procedures for deciding
judicial review issues.146 When a request reaches the Supreme Court, it
141. Id. at 18.
142. Stera Mahkama Afghanistan ruling No. 5, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 986.
See also, Stera Mahkama Afghanistan ruling No. 6, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 986.
143. Supreme Court of Afghanistan Ruling No. 20, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE No.
1114.*
144. HARESS, supra note 5, at 19.
145. Interview with Mohammad Sediq Zhobl, supra note 48 (on file with author).
146. HARESS, supra note 5, at 19.
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goes to the Directorate General of Scrutiny and Perusal.147 The General
Directorate of Scrutiny and Perusal, which acts as the research body of
the Supreme Court, primarily performs a review of the subjects in
question and then shares the arguments with a proposed text of verdict
to the High Council meeting for final decision-making.148 However, in
the absence of established and elaborated procedures, there is little
known about how the issues are discussed and how the Supreme Court
High Council comes to a conclusion on a given subject.
Constitutional matters possess sophisticated aspects, and every
decision made by the decision making body should be well reasoned
and justified.149 The standard of reasoning in judicial review cases
decided by the Supreme Court differs from one case to the other.150
While the Supreme Court conducts robust analysis in some cases, its
reasoning in other cases is less substantial. For instance, when the
Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of the ICOIC Law, it
considered the ICOIC as part of the executive branch,151 while the
Constitution clearly recognizes the independence of the ICOIC.152 In
addition, the Supreme Court erred in mixing review of constitutionality
with review of laws and giving feedback for improvement of legislation
when it reviewed the ICOIC Law.
Some Supreme Court judicial review decisions also show that
whenever a question is raised even on one article, the Supreme Court
entitles itself to review the constitutionality of the entire law. This has
been evident in review of ICOIC Law. Though the government's
questions were about Article 8, which concerns the interpretation of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court did not stop there and went on to
review constitutionality of other articles that had not been asked by the
government.
The Supreme Court has followed the trend of inconsistency even
in the title of its judicial review decisions. The Court used different
phrases bearing different legal meanings in its decisions. Ghizaal Haress
puts this inconsistency in the following language: “The four opinions
presented are under different titles: two of them are called Qaraar
Qazayee (judicial verdict), Musaweba Shura-i-Aali (the decision of the
High Council), and Hukm-e-Qazayee (judicial ruling).”153
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 19-20.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 25.
Stera Mahkama Afghanistan ruling No. 6, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 986.
See 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 157.
HARESS, supra note 5, at 29.

FINAL_FOR_JCI

2019]

5/19/2020 5:45 AM

Constitutional Interpretation in Afghanistan

247

In the absence of a law, an internal procedure that unifies the steps,
procedures, timelines and terms could be very helpful in bringing some
level of consistency to judicial review in Afghanistan.
5. Type of Review
Constitutional review is conducted either before (priori) or after
(posteriori) legislation comes into force.154 In Afghanistan, judicial
review has been done on a posteriori basis. This principle is unwritten;
however, Article 121 of the Constitution mentions the word “law” and,
as defined by the Constitution, “[l]aw shall be what both houses of the
National Assembly approve and the President endorses, unless this
Constitution states otherwise.”155 While it is assumed that the review
takes place on a posteriori basis, a posteriori review of international
treaties is not practical. Given the existence of the issue, the new draft
Law on Jurisdiction and Organization of the Judiciary, which is debated
in the National Assembly, requires a posteriori review of laws and
legislative decrees, and a priori review of international treaties before
Afghanistan can accept those treaties.156 The Supreme Court has yet to
receive a request for reviewing the constitutionality of an international
treaty.
In most cases, after rejecting the legislation by the President, Wolsi
Jirga passes those laws without any changes by two-thirds majority in
which case, those laws are considered as approved without endorsement
of the President.157 In 2018, the government established a committee to
scrutinize the laws passed by the National Assembly before they are
submitted to the President. If the committee realizes there are
constitutionality issues, like in the case of the Law on Issuance of
Legislative Decrees, it recommends submission of the law to the
Supreme Court to ensure its constitutionality.158 Only in the case of Law
on Diplomatic and Consular Employees, after the President signed the
law, did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs raise concerns and ask the

154. VISSER, supra note 4, at 96.
155. 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 94.
156. Draft Law on Jurisdiction and Organization of the Judiciary, art. 16.2 (2018) (Afg.) (on
file with author).
157. 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 94.
158. The committee is led by the 2nd Vice President and has representatives from the
Ministry of Justice, Administrative Office of the President, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs and
representatives of the relevant agency that the legislation is related to. The author has represented
the Administrative Office of the President in a number of those meetings including the meeting in
which it was decided that the government requests from the Supreme Court to review the
constitutionality of the Law on Issuance of Legislative Decrees.

FINAL_FOR_JCI

248

5/19/2020 5:45 AM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 42:2

Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of that law.159 To
summarize, the law or the legislative decree should be in force before
the government or the courts can ask for a review. From the
constitutional point of view, priori review is not possible.
In contrast to what is said about the requirement of priori review,160
the Supreme Court has provided opinions on draft laws.161 The Supreme
Court has previously provided opinions on the constitutionality of the
draft Labor Code, draft Law on Sale of Land, draft Law of Academy of
Sciences, draft Law of Military Courts, draft Law of Civil Servants,
draft Law of Salary of Senior Officials, draft Law of ICOIC, and draft
Law of Media.162 The Supreme Court has also provided its opinion on
the draft Family Law in response to a request from the Ministry of
Justice.163 This again shows lack of consistency. While the Supreme
Court is strict in handling some cases, it has been willing to accept other
cases even if the practice does not have any basis in the Constitution or
the laws.
Meanwhile, an official letter from the Administrative Office of the
President to ICOIC shows that President Karzai had asked his
Administrative Office to share draft laws after cabinet approval, and
before sharing with the National Assembly, for review of ICOIC.164 This
could have been a type of priori review. However, this step has been
discontinued and is not part of legislative processes anymore.
6. Publishing the Decisions
The Supreme Court does not publish its decisions on constitutional
matters immediately after decisions are made. The public gets
information on the decision from the parties involved through local
media. Months after the decisions are issued, the Ministry of Justice
publishes the concerned laws along with the verdict of the Supreme
Court in the Official Gazette.165 Departing from custom, the Ministry of
Justice published the Supreme Court verdict on the Law on Diplomatic

159. Supreme Court of Afghanistan Ruling No. 20, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE No.
1114.*
160. Letter from Supreme Court to Administrative Office, Letter No. 2709/909 (Afg.).
161. Saalnama Qaza, A Reflection of the Activities and Achievements of the Judicial Branch,
1 JUD. Y.B. 75, 75-76 (2014).*
162. Id.*
163. Id. at 85.*
164. INDEPENDENT COMM’N FOR OVERSEEING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, A COLLECTION OF INTERPRETATIONS, LEGAL AND ADVISORY OPINIONS (2014).
165. HARESS, supra note 5, at 17.
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and Consular Employees separately in the Official Gazette.166 This was
because the law had been published, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
challenged the constitutionality of the law after its enforcement.167
Judicial review decisions and interpretation are highly important to
citizens and government entities alike. Lack of publishing or late
publishing only tarnishes the importance of this critical process.
Understanding the importance of these cases, the High Council of Rule
of Law and Anti-Corruption has requested that the Supreme Court
publish those decisions.168 In addition, based on the recently approved
draft Law on Jurisdiction and Organization of the Judiciary, the
Supreme Court is obliged to publish judicial review and constitutional
interpretation decisions in the Official Gazette and other media
outlets.169
The published decisions contain the arguments and conclusions of
the Supreme Court. The Ministry of Justice publishes the Supreme
Court decision in full length in Farsi and Pashto, the two official
languages of the country.170 However, the Ministry of Justice removes
the articles that are deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court from
the main body of the law and keeps the places of the removed articles
blank.171 Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice adds a footnote on the
same page and clarifies that the article or clause is removed as a result
of the Supreme Court decision. Action of the Ministry of Justice is
procedural and is meant to put an effect on the decision of the Supreme
Court.
There are also reports of unpublished decisions. For instance, after
an initial rejection by the President, Wolsi Jirga passed the Law on
Salary, Expenditures and Privileges of State High Officials by a twothirds majority in 2009. The President then asked the Supreme Court to
review the constitutionality of this law. While the Supreme Court

166. Supreme Court of Afghanistan Ruling No. 20, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE No.
1114.*
167. Id.*
168.  ﺟﻠﺴﮫ ﺷﻮرای ﻋﺎﻟﯽ ﺣﺎﮐﻤﯿﺖ ﻗﺎﻧﻮن و ﻣﺒﺎرزه ﻋﻠﯿﮫ ﻓﺴﺎد اداری١٣٩٧  ( ﺳﺎل٢ ) ﻣﺼﻮﺑﮫ ﺷﻤﺎره
[Resolution No. (2) of 1397 of the Meeting of the Supreme Council of the Rule of Law and the
Fight Against Corruption], AOP.GOV.AF (May 2, 2018), https://www.aop.gov.af/dr/page/80/217
(Afg.) (on file with author).
169. Draft Law on Jurisdiction and Organization of the Judiciary, art. 16.3 (2018) (Afg.) (on
file with author).
170. See Supreme Court of Afghanistan Ruling No. 20, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE
No. 1114.*
171. HARESS, supra note 5, at 17.
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announced the law as unconstitutional,172 the Ministry of Justice never
published it.
As mentioned in previous sections, the Supreme Court has a
number of publications, including a yearbook and magazines that
contain the collection of estihda of the lower courts. In these
publications, there are also cases of request for guidance on
constitutional matters and responses of the Supreme Court.
7. Enforceability of Supreme Court Decisions
The text of Article 121 of the Constitution does not clarify whether
judicial review and interpretive decisions made by the Supreme Court
are merely advisory, or rather final and thus must be enforced.173
However, the practice and the wording of Supreme Court verdicts give
the impression that they are final, enforceable, and not appealable. In
one of the requests for interpretation of the Law on Pension, the
Supreme Court ruled that there is no difference between a court decision
and a Supreme Court decision interpreting a law.174 The Supreme Court
continued by stating that executing interpretive decisions is the
responsibility of the Executive branch.175 This language and
implementation of the decisions by state organs proves the decisions are
final, though there has been some resistance by Wolsi Jirga following
the Spanta case.176 This is not an unfamiliar incident; after Marbury v.
Madison, although President Jefferson was not happy with the decision
and initially objected, believing John Marshall used the opportunity to
expand the authority of the judiciary, he eventually bowed to the
decision.177
After the Supreme Court concludes a judicial review case, the
Ministry of Justice publishes the law in the Official Gazette. However,
there is no immediate subsequent action by either the National
Assembly or the executive branch to fill the gap created by the removal
of selected articles.178 The impact of this gap was felt when the Supreme
172. Due to the sensitivity of the matter, the case is not published. The author possesses an
unofficial copy of the decision.
173. 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 121.
174. SUPREME COURT OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, COLLECTION OF SUPREME
COURT CIRCULARS, DECISIONS, AND GUIDELINES FOR 1389-93 (2010-14) (2013).*
175. Id.*
176. ROSE LEDA EHLER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
AFGHANISTAN (Stephanie Ahmad et al. eds., 2013).
177. Thomas Jefferson’s Reaction, LANDMARK CASES, https://www.landmarkcases.org/
marbury-v-madison/thomas-jeffersons-reaction (last visited June 12, 2018); ROSE LEDA EHLER
ET AL., supra note 176.
178. HARESS, supra note 5, at 17.
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Court declared certain articles of ICOIC Law unconstitutional.179 One of
the articles was about the process of dismissing members.180 ICOIC did
not propose new articles, nor did the National Assembly take action to
add new articles. In 2017, when the majority of ICOIC members voted
to oust the Chairperson of ICOIC, the challenge surfaced. On one hand,
the majority members of the ICOIC had made a decision to remove the
Chairperson. On the other hand, the replacement legislation was not in
place. An ICOIC member argued that by removing the text of articles
from the law, the Supreme Court departed from its original role in the
Constitution and was actually making law.181 Though this criticism is
valid, it is obvious that the Supreme Court is not the party to be blamed.
It was the job of the ICOIC, the executive branch or National Assembly
to propose new articles to fill in the gap before it became too late.
There are also cases in which the Supreme Court, after providing
an opinion on a matter, suggested that an amendment be made to the
law. For example, after reviewing Article 39 of the Law on Elimination
of Violence against Women, the Supreme Court announced the Article
is inapplicable to crimes against women that do not originate from
family relationships.182 The Supreme Court also explained in its opinion
that it had proposed an amendment to the law and shared it with the
Ministry of Justice for further consideration.183 While the Supreme
Court can request the government and the National Assembly to replace
legislation, it is also the responsibility of the government and the
National Assembly to take responsibility and to fill in the gaps quickly
before a controversy erupts. Again, regulating legislation can prevent
similar controversies.
8. The Impact on Individuals’ Human Rights
The limitation on the entities that can request judicial review and
interpretation of legislative documents has resulted in the growing
irrelevance of judicial review as a tool for protecting the fundamental
rights of individuals. In most countries, judicial review is a key
instrument in striking down the legislation or government acts that are
not upholding the constitutional rights of the citizens.184 Ambiguity in
Article 121 of the Constitution strips individuals of this important
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Interview with Ghizaal Haress, supra note 127 (on file with author).
Stera Mahkama Afghanistan ruling No. 6, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 986.
HARESS, supra note 5, at 17.
See Qaza, supra note 161, at 80.*
Id.*
VISSER, supra note 4, at 61-62.
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opportunity.185 Additionally, institutions such as the National Assembly
or Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission also lack this
right.186 Under these circumstances, judicial review decisions have thus
far had a minimal impact on the rights of citizens.
There is also legislation that seems to violate the terms of the
Constitution; however, there is no interest on the part of the government
or the courts to ask the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of
such legislation. The Law of National Reconciliation, Public Amnesty
and National Stability, passed in 2007 by the National Assembly, is a
bold example.187 This Law extended a pardon to criminal acts
committed by individuals during the years of war in Afghanistan.188 Had
the individuals had the opportunity to request for judicial review, there
could have been requests made by individuals on the constitutionality of
that law.189
Despite those limitations, in at least one example, civil society
organizations asked the Supreme Court to decriminalize the ‘escape
from home’ phenomenon, which results from violence against a
woman.190 The Supreme Court accepted the request and agreed with the
interpretation of the civil society organizations.191 However, in its
response, the Supreme Court failed to mention a single article of the
Constitution or the ordinary laws.192 Is this an indication that the
Supreme Court is willing to hear requests by individuals, and if so, is it
constitutional to accept such requests directly? Or this is another
example of inconsistency?
As explained above and illustrated by numerous examples,
inconsistency is a common feature in nearly all judicial review
decisions so far. Lack of clear procedures has resulted in varying
decisions. To examine this further, Part B explains the most important
cases of judicial review decided by the Supreme Court to date.
B. Landmark Judicial Review Cases Under the 2004 Constitution
Reviewing the key judicial review decisions will provide a better
understanding of the challenges and the flaws of the process. This
185.
186.
187.
188.

2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 121.
Id.
HARESS, supra note 5, at 31.
Afghanistan Law of National Reconciliation, Public Amnesty and National Stability,
AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE NO. 985, Art. 3 (2008).
189. HARESS, supra note 5, at 31.
190. Qaza, supra note 161, at 80.*
191. Id.*
192. Id. at 80.*
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article gives a detailed analysis of one the predominant cases of judicial
review and provides a brief analysis of other relevant cases of judicial
review. The Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court have published
only a few judicial review decisions. Therefore, this list is not
comprehensive.
1. Judicial Review of ICOIC Law
Establishment of the ICOIC was foreseen in Article 157 of the
Constitution; however, the authorities of this entity are not outlined.193
The Constitution only articulates the appointment mechanism of ICOIC
members and requires parliamentary legislation for defining ICOIC
authorities.194 In a move to challenge the decision of the Supreme Court
in Spanta,195 Wolsi Jirga added a clause in the ICOIC Law that
authorized the ICOIC to interpret the Constitution.196 Mishrano Jirga
also approved the law; however, the President did not sign the law and
sent it back to Wolsi Jirga, citing unconstitutionality of several
articles.197 Furious about the President’s position on the subject, Wolsi
Jirga approved the law with the two-thirds majority required for
bypassing the signature of the President.198 Given the decision of the
Supreme Court in Spanta, it was expected that the President would ask
the Supreme Court to review the law’s constitutionality.
In the Spanta case, President Karzai triggered Article 121 of the
Constitution, requesting interpretation of the Constitution. However, the
ICOIC Law was the first law to undergo judicial review. As a result, the
Supreme Court announced a number of the ICOIC Law articles
unconstitutional.199 Given the importance of the Spanta case to the
future of judicial review, it is important to review how the Supreme

193. 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 157.
194. Id.
195. In one of the first cases of constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court decided that
the dismissal of Rangin Dadfar Spanta, Minister of Foreign Affairs, by Wolsi Jirga was not based
on justifiable reasons and therefore held he should be able to continue his job. This case will be
discussed in detail in the section on constitutional interpretation. HARESS, supra note 5, at 17;
ROSE LEDA EHLER ET AL., supra note 176, at 150.
196. MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, AFGHANISTAN’S CONSTITUTION TEN YEARS ON:
WHAT ARE THE ISSUES? 11 (2014).
197. Official documents on what questions were raised by the government are unavailable;
however, it appears from the decision of the Supreme Court that the government likely asked for
review of the constitutionality of the law. KAMALI, supra note 196, at 12.
198. See 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN.
199. Supreme Court of Afghanistan Opinion No. 5, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE No.
986.*
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Court analyzed the facts of the case and how the decision was
ultimately reached.
In its decision, the Supreme Court provided several justifications
in support of maintaining its authority to interpret the Constitution.200
Below is a summary of the Supreme Court’s reasoning extracted from
the original decision:
(i) The Supreme Court stated that based on the archives of the
Constitution Drafting Commission, Article 121 did not exist in
the initial drafts of the Constitution. Before September 10,
2003, the draft included a separate chapter regarding a
Constitutional Court, which was assigned the authority to (1)
review the conformity of laws, legislative decrees,
international agreements, and Constitutional covenants, and (2)
interpret the Constitution, laws and legislative decrees.
(ii) The Supreme Court adds that after September 2003, the
chapter on Constitutional Court was removed for unknown
reasons. Instead, the authorities, which had been given to the
Constitutional Court, were assigned to the Supreme Court
under Article 121. The language used in the draft Constitution
that was distributed to the Constitutional Loya Jirga read as
follows: “At the request of only the government and courts, the
Supreme Court shall review conformity of laws, legislative
decrees, inter-state treaties and international covenants with the
Constitution and issue the required verdict. Supreme Court is
authorized to interpret the Constitution, laws and legislative
decrees.” The Supreme Court argues that the Constitutional
Loya Jirga merely combined the two sentences to make the
sentence more precise. In addition, the Supreme Court argues
that the Constitution, the laws, legislative decrees, inter-state
treaties and international conventions need interpretation.
Therefore, merging the two sentences and using the word
“their” made it possible for the Supreme Court to interpret the
international treaties and covenants as well. The Supreme
Court concluded that the best word that could be used was the
word “their” since it covers the interpretation of the
constitution, the laws, legislative documents, inter-state treaties
and international covenants.
(iii) The Supreme Court also addresses Article157, which
outlines the mechanism to establish the ICOIC. The Court
mentions that this Article was not part of the draft Constitution
and was added by Constitutional Loya Jirga on its last day.
Even after the addition of Article 157, no further change was
200. Id.*
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made to Article 121. Adding an article regarding ICOIC
without giving the authority of Constitutional interpretation to
ICOIC implies that the authority to interpret the Constitution
remains with the Supreme Court.
(iv) The Supreme Court asserts that interpreting the
Constitution, legislative decrees and laws requires a mandatory
judicial verdict, which can only be issued by a court.
(v) Finally, the Supreme Court argued that the very name of
the ICOIC suggests that the job of the commission should be
limited to overseeing the implementation of the Constitution,
rather than interpreting it. If the ICOIC has the authority of
interpretation, the Constitution is effectively amended, which
is only allowed through Loya Jirga.201
The Supreme Court explains the history of how Article 121 was
drafted and the intentions behind it.202 Having the history in mind, it is
difficult to argue the ICOIC should have the authority to interpret the
Constitution. While the Supreme Court interprets the laws, legislative
decrees, inter-state treaties and international conventions, it also reviews
their conformity with the Constitution. As Sarwar Danish, a former
member of the Constitution Drafting Commission argues, no other
country has a system that assigns the authority of judicial review to one
institution, while leaving the interpretation of the Constitution in the
hands of another institution.203
The argument made by the Supreme Court on the role of ICOIC on
Constitutional oversight is also worth considering. Having vague
language on interpretation of the Constitution does not mean this task
should be given to an organization that was merely established to
oversee the implementation of the Constitution. As the name of ICOIC
suggests, this institution was established to oversee the implementation
of the Constitution. Neither in Loya Jirga discussions, nor in the
Constitution itself is there an indication that Loya Jirga intended to
assign interpretation of the Constitution to ICOIC.204 Regardless, ICOIC
was of the view that since Article 121 does not have an explicit
language on assigning the authority of interpretation of the Constitution
to the Supreme Court,205 it is up to the National Assembly to decide

201. Id.
202. Id.
203. DANISH, supra note 99 (on file with author).
204. ROSE LEDA EHLER ET AL., supra note 176, at 34.
205. Ariz Huq and Tom Ginsburg, What Can Constitutions Do?: The Afghan Case, 24 J. OF
DEM. 1, 125 (2014).
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which organization has this authority.206 This argument looks
compelling; however, the drafting history of Article 121, coupled with
the Supreme Court’s authority to interpret laws, legislative decrees and
inter-state treaties makes it illogical to have a separate institution
interpret the Constitution. Many commentators who wrote on
Afghanistan’s Constitution also agree with this argument.207
The Supreme Court did not stop after declaring Article 8
unconstitutional; it went ahead with nullifying other articles of ICOIC
Law.208 One such example is the article that established a mechanism for
removal of a member through a proposal209 made by at least five
members and approved by the majority of Wolsi Jirga.210 The Supreme
Court found this provision unconstitutional for the following reasons:
(1) ICOIC is not a commercial company in which its members decide
on the removal of other members; (2) Wolsi Jirga is not the executive
branch to remove members of a committee that is part of the executive
branch; (3) though appointment of ministers, Attorney General, Director
of National Security, President of the Central Bank and the Director of
Red Crescent is confirmed by Wolsi Jirga, the President is charged with
handling their dismissal or acceptance of resignation and; (4) the
proposal to remove a member of ICOIC by the other members would
seriously undermine the independence of the organization and would
create fear that ICOIC is influenced by Wolsi Jirga.211 The Supreme
Court’s argument regarding the possible political influence of the Wolsi
Jirga, as the authority, which was supposed to impeach members of
ICOIC, is understandable and justified, a point that is also emphasized
by leading constitutional law scholars.212 However, comparing the
ICOIC to a corporation does not make sense. The Constitution uses a
similar procedure requiring vote of the relevant house of the National
Assembly to hand-over a member to the prosecution office for
206. ROSE LEDA EHLER ET AL., supra note 176, at 34.
207. Rainer Grote, Separation of Powers in the New Afghan Constitution, 64 ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT[ZAÖRV] 897 (2004) (Ger.).
208. Supreme Court of Afghanistan Opinion No. 5, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE No.
986.*
209. The reasons for initiating the removal process are written in Article 7 of ICOIC Law: (1)
having another occupation except for teaching in the university; (2) losing or breaching one of the
qualification criteria described in Article 5; and (3) misuse of official position, lack of
commitment to work and regular lack of performance. HARESS, supra note 5, at 26.
210. Law on Independent Commission on Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution,
AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 986, (2009) (Afg.).
211. Supreme Court of Afghanistan Opinion No. 5, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE NO.
986.*
212. VISSER, supra note 4, at 222.
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committing a crime.213 In a large number of countries with entities
similar to the ICOIC, it is up to the members to remove each other. 214
The bodies charged with constitutional review in Belgium, the Czech
Republic, Germany, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Spain, among
others, exercise a similar removal procedure.215
The Supreme Court also found it unconstitutional for the ICOIC to
review existing laws, identify unconstitutional articles and submit them
to the President and the National Assembly for correction. In the eyes of
the Supreme Court this was also unconstitutional because Article 121 of
the Constitution not only authorizes the Supreme Court to interpret the
Constitution, laws, legislative decrees, inter-state treaties and
international covenants, but also gives the sole authority to review the
constitutionality of the aforementioned legislative instruments to the
Supreme Court.216 The argument of the Supreme Court is not
compelling. It is obvious that constitutional review is a completely
different mechanism than reviewing laws with the objective of
providing recommendations to improve them.217 Any branch can
exercise the latter and it does not trespass on the authority of the
Supreme Court.
Restricting ICOIC membership to only those with Afghan
nationality and the immunity of ICOIC members from arrest without
agreement of the President were the two other points declared
unconstitutional and thus unenforceable by the Supreme Court.218
Countries around the world have different approaches on these two
subjects.219 The Supreme Court introduced a concept based on which
ordinary laws cannot extend the number, authorities or conditions listed
in the Constitution. This concept might be difficult to defend in the
future because ordinary laws usually expand upon the topics that have a
brief mention in the Constitution.
The judicial review of ICOIC law is by far the most detailed
decision of the Supreme Court yet.220 This outcome was expected as the
ICOIC law passed by the National Assembly had the intention to restrict
213.
214.
215.
216.
986.*
217.
218.
986.*
219.
220.

See 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN.
VISSER, supra note 4, at 222.
Id.
Supreme Court of Afghanistan Opinion No. 5, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE NO.
HARESS, supra note 5, at 27.
Supreme Court of Afghanistan Opinion No. 5, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE NO.
VISSER, supra note 4, at 222.
HARESS, supra note 5, at 27.
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the role of the Supreme Court.221 The Supreme Court, by providing a
deep analysis of the subject matters, wanted to put an end to the
questions and prove itself as the final authority on Constitutional
interpretation. Despite the Supreme Court’s attempt, the controversy
around constitutional review persists.
Other cases of judicial review are listed briefly here:
2. Law on Mass Media
In 2009, in response to a government request, the Supreme Court
announced that paragraph 2 of Article 13 of the Mass Media Law,
which required Wolesi Jirga approval for appointment of Director of
National TV and Radio, was unconstitutional.222 The Supreme Court
argued that the Constitution enlists the officials whose appointments
need Wolesi Jirga’s approval and that the Director of National TV and
Radio is not among them.223
3. Decision on Law of Diplomatic and Consular Employees
The National Assembly restricted diplomatic employment only to
those individuals who are nationals of Afghanistan exclusively.224 At the
request of the government, the Supreme Court rejected the limitations,
arguing that the Afghan nationality requirement is limited to holding the
office of the Presidency, Vice Presidency and would conditionally apply
to ministers but not anyone else.225
4. Law on Legislative Decrees
In 2018, the Supreme Court declared the Law on Legislative
Decrees unconstitutional.226 The Supreme Court concluded that adopting
a law on legislative decrees is an infringement on the work of the
Executive Branch.227

221. Id.
222. Supreme Court of Afghanistan Opinion No. 6, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE NO.
986.
223. Id.
224. Stera Mahkama Afghanistan [Supreme Court of Afghanistan] ruling No. 20 Regarding
Lack of Compliance of Article 5(1) and Article 8 of the Law on Diplomatic and Consular
Employees with the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan Official
Gazette No. 1114 (2013) (Afg.).*
225. Id.
226. Stera Mahkama Afghanistan [Supreme Court of Afghanistan] ruling No. 71, Feb. 3,
2018, Afghanistan Official Gazette No. 1285 (Afg.).*
227. Id.*
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5. Other Less Publicized Cases
In addition to the above cases, the Supreme Court has also
reviewed other laws which are listed here:
(i) Law on Salaries, Expenditures and Privileges of State
Senior Officials: In 2009, the government asked the Supreme
Court to review the constitutionality of the Law on Salaries,
Expenditures and Privileges of State Senior Officials. This
decision was never announced, nor was it published.228
(ii) Law for Secured Transactions on Immovable Property in
Banking Transactions
(iii) Law on Property Dealers: After review, the Law of
Property Dealers, the cabinet instructed Ministry of Justice to
ask the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of clause
1, Article 34 and Article 35 of the Law.229
(iv) Labor Law
(v) Law on Sale of Land
(vi) Law of Academy of Sciences
(vii) Law of Civil Servants
(viii) Law of Military Courts230
C. Flaws and Gaps in Judicial Review Process of Afghanistan
Initially, it was not expected that Article 121 of the Constitution
would be difficult to implement.231 However, the vague language of
Article 121 and the lack of regulating legislation made judicial review
inconsistent and sometimes controversial. The following paragraphs
explain the main flaws of judicial review that surfaced after
enforcement of the 2004 Constitution.
1. Judicial Review Undermined by Constitutional Interpretation
Judicial review is a new phenomenon in the constitutional culture
of Afghanistan. However, the concept of constitutional interpretation
has attracted more attention. Most politicians and Afghan citizens do
not make a clear distinction between the two concepts and many see
Article 121 of the Constitution as an “interpretation clause” rather than
a “judicial review clause.”232 As such, judicial review is underdeveloped

228.
sources.
229.
230.
231.
232.

The author has an official copy of the decision on file that is received from private
Cabinet Decision on Request from Supreme Court (Mar. 2, 2017).
Qaza, supra note 161, at 75-76.*
HARESS, supra note 5, at 3.
HARESS, supra note 5, at 17.
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and has been practiced inconsistently.233 Unfortunately, judges do not
have a clear understanding of how judicial review works and they are
not trained either.234 The review of the questions raised by judges, as
estihda, illustrate that the judges just post a question to the Supreme
Court rather than trying to contextualize their questions as a concrete
dispute that has come before the court. A training program for judges
and other actors involved in this area is required to clarify the
distinctions and draw attention to the role of judicial review in
protecting individual rights and constitutional values.235
2. Limitation on Accessibility
Article 121 of the Constitution only empowers the government and
the courts to ask the Supreme Court for judicial review.236 Compared to
the courts, the executive branch has used this mechanism excessively.237
The courts have only raised questions regarding the meaning of some
terms in the laws, or have merely pointed to an article of the law that
they considered unconstitutional.238 There is no record if individual
litigants challenge the constitutionality of any law, legislative document
or international treaty in the courts.239 Even if individual litigants have
challenged the constitutionality of a law, their requests may have been
ignored or unheard since there is no outlined procedure for this
purpose.240 In the absence of any law or other legislative documents,
whether an individual litigant is able to file a case on the
constitutionality of laws or legislative documents directly in ordinary
courts remains unanswered.241 However, in a rather surprising
instruction, the High Council of Supreme Court in January 2008 asked
the primary courts not to share their requests for guidance, estihda,
directly to the Supreme Court; and instead, they should try to find an
answer with the help of the provincial appellate court.242 The High
Council clarified the primary courts are working under supervision of
233. Id. at 3.
234. Id. at 21.
235. Id. at 39.
236. 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 121.
237. HARESS, supra note 5, at 22.
238. Id. at 20.
239. Id. at 22.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 19.
242. Nooru-Rahman Mayar, Motahedulmalhay Motafareqa Salhay 1385 - 1396
[Miscellaneous Circulars of March 21, 2006 to March 20, 2017] at 217 (2018) (Afg.)
(unpublished circulars by the Supreme Court of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) (on file
with author).
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the appellate courts and thus the primary courts are not authorized to
ask for estihda to the Supreme Court directly.243
There is a possibility that the drafters of the 2004 Constitution
thought that whenever an individual litigant challenges the
constitutionality of an act, the case should be stopped and the lower
court would request the Supreme Court for review. In contrast, and as
described earlier, ordinary courts usually ask the Supreme Court for
guidance (estihda) when they face challenging questions; however,
these questions are general in nature and not in the context of specific
disputes before the court.244
Under either of these interpretations, the right to question
constitutionality in Afghanistan is very limited. Unlike some countries
where the speakers and/or members of parliament, can ask for
constitutional review of legislative or executive acts,245 Afghanistan has
adopted a conservative approach for the use of judicial review resulting
in decisions being struck down that do not favor government interests.246
This is somewhat comparable to the Constitutional Council of France
between 1958 and 1970.247 Charles de Gaulle is quoted as saying the
Constitutional Council is a “cannon directed against the Parliament" to
protect the interests of the executive against the legislature.248 Nearly all
cases decided by the Constitutional Council of France during that period
were in favor of the executive branch.249 France addressed this drawback
by extending access to the Constitutional Council to a range of clients,
including individuals, as part of the 2008 constitutional amendments.250
In many countries, individuals have the opportunity to request
judicial review of laws or government acts.251 In Afghanistan,
individuals might theoretically be able to raise questions about the
unconstitutionality of legislative documents before the court during the
course of litigation; however, it is completely up to the court whether to
ask the Supreme Court for judicial review or simply ignore such
243. Id. at 217.
244. See Qaza, supra note 161, at 75-76.*
245. VISSER, supra note 4, at 223.
246. HARESS, supra note 5, at 3.
247. See generally Xavier Philippe, Constitutional Review in France: The Extended Role of
the Conseil Constitutionnel through the New Priority Preliminary Rulings Procedure, UNIV.
PAUL CÉZANNE (AIX-MARSEILLE III), https://www.ajk.elte.hu/file/annales_2012_04_Xavier.pdf
(last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
248. Id. at 65.
249. ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 60 (1992).
250. 2008 CONST. amends art. 61.1 (Fr.).
251. See generally VISSER, supra note 4.
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requests.252 Therefore, judicial review has not been an effective
instrument to uphold citizens’ fundamental rights.253Rather it is used to
uphold the interests of the executive in particular.254
3. Compliance with Sharia
Prohibition of laws that contradict Sharia is a debated subject
matter in Afghanistan. The 2004 Constitution states that no law shall be
against the tenants of Islam.255 The Supreme Court, based on Article
121, is the guardian of the Constitution; however, the Constitution is not
clear which entity ensures that contradiction between laws and Sharia
does not occur.256
One assumption is that the Supreme Court should also examine
laws’ compliance with Sharia if asked by the courts or the
government.257 In fact, the existence of Dar-ul-efta or Center of Fatwa,
as part of the Supreme Court could be evidence of the Supreme Court’s
willingness to conduct judicial review and interpretation under the lens
of Sharia. Moreover, in one case where the government asked the
Supreme Court to interpret Article 7 of the Constitution, the Supreme
Court relied heavily on Article 3 in its analysis.258 Article 7 obligates the
Government to observe and implement the international treaties that
Afghanistan has joined,259 while Article 3, the repugnancy clause,
prohibits laws that are against the principles of Sharia.260 The Supreme
Court argued that if any international treaty that Afghanistan has
acceded to contradicts Article 3 of the Constitution, the government,
considering Article 3 and international law principles, has the right to
proceed with withdrawing Afghanistan from those treaties.261
On the other hand, there is a notion that rejects the authority of
Supreme Court to review compliance of legislation with the
Constitution and emphasizes the lack of clarity on this matter.262 There
have not been any judicial review cases referred to the Supreme Court
on this ground, though there have been a number of occasions where
ordinary courts have stopped applying the laws because they consider
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

HARESS, supra note 5, at 31.
Id.
Id. at 28.
2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 3.
HARESS, supra note 5, at 13.
Id. at 13.
Qaza, supra note 161, at 83-85.*
ROSE LEDA EHLER ET AL., supra note 176, at 196.
HARESS, supra note 5, at 13.
Qaza, supra note 161, at 83-85.*
HARESS, supra note 5, at 13.
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the laws contrary to Sharia.263 One example is hesitation of courts on
decisions related to interest or riba (usurious interest rates or predatory
interest practices in financial transactions) in commercial transactions
because Sharia prohibits riba as haram. The law does not allow courts
to stop using legislative documents if they believe they contradict
Sharia.264 Instead of ignoring the laws, the courts should have the
opportunity to ask the Supreme Court to decide whether the law
conforms with the Constitution or not.
4. Lack of Enabling Legislation
To regulate judicial review and interpretation, the Constitution
requires a law to be passed by the National Assembly.265 Fourteen years
after the Constitution’s adoption, the law required in Article 121 is not
in place.266 The primary piece of legislation related to the work of the
judiciary is the Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of the Judiciary;
however, it only has one article regarding interpretation and judicial
review.267 As mentioned earlier, a new Law on Organization and
Jurisdiction of Judiciary is currently debated in the National Assembly,
which has more guidance on judicial review and interpretation;
however, it does not provide detailed procedures.268
Typically, a proposed law should outline the process to file a case
and specify the timelines, explain the procedures, clarify how to raise
questions of constitutionality in the courts, and mandate passage of
regulations and internal procedures for the Supreme Court to decide
cases of judicial review and constitutional interpretation.
5. Judicial Review of Regulations
Judicial review of regulations and government acts is a critical part
of legal systems. Different approaches, such as using ordinary courts,
administrative courts or administrative bodies, are applied to strike
down regulations, policies or government acts that contradict laws
approved by the legislature.269 The 2004 Constitution authorizes the
government to pass regulations and requires the regulations to conform
263. Interview with Ghizaal Haress, supra note 127 (on file with author).
264. Id.
265. See 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN.
266. Interview with Mohammad Sediq Zhobl, supra note 48 (on file with author).
267. HARESS, supra note 5, at 19.
268. Draft Law on Jurisdiction and Organization of the Judiciary (2018) (Afg.) (on file with
author).
269. FRANCESA BIGNAMI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION: UNDERSTANDING THE
GLOBAL REGULATORY PROCESS 2 (2016).
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with the spirit and body of laws.270 However, it does not specify which
entity ensures compliance.271 In the winter of 2018, the Administrative
Procedures Law required that such questions be asked to the public
rights courts, though there is no evidence that shows such requests are
made to the ordinary courts. Currently, the only entity that can abolish
or amend the regulations is the Cabinet, which is also the authority that
approves regulations. There are examples, however, that the Supreme
Court has provided comments on regulation-type documents at the
request of the executive branch institutions. In 2008, Independent
Directorate of Local Governance requested the Supreme Court to
review the Bylaw on Terms of References and Authorities of the
Governors and provide their opinions.272 An expert team assigned by the
Supreme Court reviewed the Bylaw against the Constitution and the
Law of Local Governance and found it compatible.273 Subsequently, the
High Council of the Supreme Court agreed with the analysis.274 Does
this mean the Supreme Court entitles itself to review regulations and
other legislative instruments approved by the executive branch for their
compliance with the law? While there are some examples of this
intention, we do not have a precise answer from the Supreme Court yet.
6. Judicial Review of International Treaties
Article 121 of the Constitution authorizes the Supreme Court to
review the constitutionality of inter-state treaties and international
covenants.275 As pointed out in earlier parts of this article, judicial
review in Afghanistan is conducted on a posteriori basis. However, it
does not make sense to have an already enforced international treaty go
through the judicial review process at the domestic level. The most
appropriate time to conduct a constitutional review is when the treaty is
under discussion or signed by the government, before the government
submits it to the National Assembly for ratification, similar to the
method employed in France.276 The recent draft Law on Jurisdiction and

270. 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN.
271. HARESS, supra note 5, at 14.
272. Mayar, supra note 242, at 198-99.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 7.
276. Who May Apply to the Constitutional Council? COUNSEIL-CONSTITUTIONNEL (Feb. 16,
2018), http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/english/homepage.14.html.*
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Organization of the Judiciary has recognized priori review of
international treaties.277
Until today, there has never been a case of review of treaties by the
Supreme Court.278 Therefore, many aspects of judicial review of
international treaties are still vague and unclear.279 The ICOIC has
received requests on the interpretation of Article 7 of the Constitution
(which is about Afghanistan’s adherence to international treaties) and
has provided its legal advice.280 The only example that applies to
judicial review of an international treaty is a request by the Afghanistan
Independent Human Rights Commission to the ICOIC to give its
opinion on the constitutionality of administrative detention centers that
kept war prisoners in the custody of foreign forces for extended periods
of time, which was mentioned in agreements between the Afghanistan
and United States governments.281 In strong words, the ICOIC
announced that the establishment of administrative detention centers is a
clear violation of the Constitution.282 While there has not been a case of
judicial review or interpretation of an international treaty in the
Supreme Court, it is clear that this subject needs attention and there
should be some clarity on how the Supreme Court exercises judicial
review over international treaties.
III. PART THREE: INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION UNDER THE
2004 CONSTITUTION
There are not many countries in the world that grant a single entity
authoritative jurisdiction for interpretation of the constitution.283 This is
partly because it poses a risk of political misuse by the requesting
bodies, particularly the executive, to run their own agendas.284 Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Slovakia among others are examples of countries that
granted this authority to their constitutional courts.285 In Afghanistan,
the subject of constitutional interpretation has undermined the concept

277. Draft Law on Jurisdiction and Organization of the Judiciary (2018) (Afg.) (on file with
author).
278. HARESS, supra note 5, at 30.
279. Id.
280. See INDEPENDENT COMM’N FOR OVERSEEING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 164.
281. Id. at 137-138.*
282. Id.*
283. VISSER, supra note 4, at 140.
284. Id. at 222.
285. Id. at 140.
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of judicial review.286 As one author writes, “[e]ventually, the intensity of
the dispute over the power of interpretation has overshadowed the
importance of judicial review in the Afghan constitutional order. Hence,
Article 121 is seen as the interpretation clause, rather than the judicial
review clause.”287 This is an accurate reflection of the politicians’
perception. The cases of judicial review have never created controversy
like the decisions on the interpretation of the Constitution. It is mainly
because the government has been accused of misusing the interpretation
clause for legitimizing its own agenda.
Constitutional interpretation is defined “as the process of
constructing, establishing the meaning of and explaining a country’s
written constitution (if there is one), other constitutional texts and other
(unwritten) norms and principles that are of constitutional quality.”288
When implementing the Constitution and laws, each implementing
agency and branch of the state needs to perform a basic interpretation of
the Constitution and laws,289 which also helps in terms of better
implementation of the Constitution. However, authoritative
interpretation is different and is usually conducted by an independent
body.290 While the text of Article 121 is clear on the authority of the
Supreme Court to interpret laws, legislative decrees, inter-state
agreements and covenants, it is not clear enough on the subject of
interpretation of the Constitution.
The general understanding is that when judicial review of laws is
conducted, the reviewing body is actually interpreting the
Constitution.291 This was the essence of the arguments in Marbury v.
Madison. In that case, John Marshall and the other justices of the United
States Supreme Court argued that it is the role of the judiciary to
determine what the proper law is by interpreting the Constitution.292
However, not everyone has the same understanding on this matter in
Afghanistan.

286. Shamshad Pasarlay, Restraining Judicial Power: The Fragmented System of Judicial
and Constitutional Interpretation in Afghanistan, 2016 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 249, 251 (2016).
287. HARESS, supra note 5, at 17.
288. VISSER, supra note 4, at 2.
289. B. Prakash Saikrishna & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 890 (2003).
290. KAMALI, supra note 196, at 4.
291. See generally B. Bisariyadi, Distinguishing Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation
in Judicial Review Cases: A Blurred Boundary Line, 18.2 JURNAL DINAMIKA HUKUM 235
(2018), (available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329839142_distinguishing_
constitutional_and_statutory_interpretation_in_judicial_review_cases_a_blurred_boundary_line).
292. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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The landmark case of Spanta in 2007 proved there are different
opinions on this issue and the difference of opinions by each branch
drove the state organs to the brink of a full-fledged constitutional
deadlock.293 To understand the importance of constitutional
interpretation in Afghanistan, it is of critical importance to examine the
facts and consequences of the Spanta case and other key cases of
constitutional interpretation.
A. Case of Spanta
The Constitution of 2004 authorizes Wolesi Jirga to question the
ministers and if not satisfied with the explanations, it can cast a vote of
no confidence to each minister separately.294 A vote of no confidence
shall be “explicit, direct and on the basis of well-founded reasons.”295
During May 2007, the Government of Islamic Republic of Iran urged
the expulsions of an estimated one million Afghan refugees.296 Media
reports about the inhumane behavior of Iranian authorities with the
Afghan refugees at the time of deportation, resulted in mass protests in
the country.297 There was additional criticism in the National
Assembly.298
Not happy with the responses from the Minister of Foreign Affairs
and the Minister of Refugees, Wolesi Jirga decided to proceed with a
vote of no confidence.299 Based on the formula set forth in Article 92 of
the Constitution, 125 out of 249 Wolesi Jirga votes were required to
oust a minister.300 Of the 197 members present in the session, 136 voted
against the Minister of Refugees, fifty-six members voted in favor and

293. Daud Qarizadah, Afghan foreign minister ‘to stay’, BBC NEWS (June 12, 2007), http://
www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6745551.stm.
294. 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 92.
295. Id.
296. Carlotta Gall, Afghan Legislators Vote Out Foreign Minister, N.Y. TIMES (May 13,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/13/world/asia/13kabul.html.
297. Afghans Protest Eviction of Refugees by Iran, DEV. NEWS FROM AFG (May 1, 2007),
https://www.afghandevnews.wordpress.com/2007/05/01/afghans-protest-eviction-of-refugees-byiran/.
298. Janne Bjerre Christensen, Guests or Trash: Iran’s Precious Policies Towards the Afghan
Refugees in the Wake of Sanctions and Regional Wars, DANISH INST. FOR INT’L STUD. Ed. 32
(2016).*
299. Afghan Parliament Flexes Its Muscles: Fm Spanta Loses No-Confidence Vote, WIKI
LEAKS (May 14, 2007, 11:22 AM).
300. 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 92.
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five votes were declared invalid.301 As a result, the speaker of Wolesi
Jirga announced the dismissal of the Minister of Refugees.302
The voting results for the Minister of Foreign Affairs followed an
interesting round. Of all votes counted, 124 votes favored dismissal of
the Minister, sixty-seven votes were in support of the Minister, three
votes were declared invalid, and one vote was declared “suspicious”
because the voter had marked both ‘Yes’ and ‘No’.”303 Controversy
began when some MPs believed that Wolesi Jirga fell short of unseating
Spanta by one vote, since Wolesi Jirga must consider the “suspicious”
vote void following the prior treatment of such votes, while others
argued that the “suspicious” vote indicated disagreement of the voter.304
At the end of the session, the Speaker of Wolesi Jirga postponed the
decision on the “suspicious” vote for the next meeting.305 The next
plenary session of Wolesi Jirga did not happen until after the weekend.
The vote of no confidence against the ministers created exciting
discussions in the media during the weekend, and thus some members
of Wolesi Jirga, who had been absent in the impeachment session,
attended the second session. The number of MPs present in the session
reached 217.306
After some discussions, Wolesi Jirga decided to vote for a second
time to determine the fate of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the
second round of voting, seventy-three votes were in Spanta’s favor, 141
votes were against him and while three votes were left blank; the result
indicated a no-confidence vote.307 While accepting the impeachment of
the Minister of Refugees, (who had a “direct working relation” to the
issue of repatriation of the refugees), the President of Afghanistan,
Hamid Karza, asked the Supreme Court to decide on the
constitutionality of the Wolesi Jirga’s no-confidence vote on the
Minister of Foreign Affairs.308 The press release by the President’s
Office in the related section said:

301. Ramin Anwari, Raa ‘edem a’etemad bh wezar mhajeran afeghanestan [No-confidence
Vote to Afghan Refugee Minister], BBCPERSIAN.COM (May 10, 2007), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
persian/afghanistan/story/2007/05/070510_k-ram-spanta-parliament.shtml (Afg.).*
302. Afghan Parliament Flexes Its Muscles: Fm Spanta Loses No-Confidence Vote, supra
note 299.
303. See generally Anwari, supra note 301.*
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. ROSE LEDA EHLER ET AL., supra note 176, at 81-86.
307. Gall, supra note 296.
308. ROSE LEDA EHLER ET AL., supra note 176, at 81-86.
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With respect to the case of Minister for Foreign Affairs, given
tremendous and non-stop efforts of Dr. Spanta concerning this
compulsory repatriation of Afghan refugees from Iran, the
President requested the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s
Supreme Court to shed light and to provide its expert opinion
on the following two issues:
I: Is this vote of no confidence [on the question of forced
repatriation of Afghans from Iran] which has no direct relation
with the mandate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, justified
or not? What does the Constitution of the country prescribe in
this particular issue?
II: What stance does the Afghan Constitution take on the
legality of holding two consecutive rounds of voting on the
single issue of impeaching the Minister of Foreign Affairs?
Taking into account the previous treatment of disputed cards
by the Afghan Parliament [which automatically treated such
cards as void] which of the two [round of voting] should be
accepted?309
Another question was asked of the Supreme Court that did not
appear in the above press release. The question was: “how to treat the
votes of those members of Wolesi Jirga who were not present in the
interpellation session, but voted in the second round?”310 The Council of
Ministers also supported the President’s request from the Supreme
Court.311
In light of these issues, the press release said the President will
decide on the case of Afghan Minister of Foreign Minister as soon as he
receives the decision of the Supreme Court, which is the legal authority
to interpret the Afghan Constitution.312 Until then, it added Dr. Spanta
remains Afghanistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.313
While Wolesi Jirga was on its summer recess, the Supreme Court
answered those questions.314 However, neither the Supreme Court, nor
any other governmental organization published the decision.315 Only the
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id.
Id. at 81-86.
Council of Ministers Decision, May 14, 2007 (Afg.) (on file with author).
ROSE LEDA EHLER ET AL., supra note 176, at 81-86.
Id. at 81-82.
Babak Khalathari & Abdul Samad, Parliamentary Bulletin 06/2007, KONRAD
ADEDAUER STIFTUNG, (2007).
315. The author received an unofficial English translation of the case through a colleague
working on a legal project in the Supreme Court. Both the Supreme Court and the government
were hesitant to publish the decision. The decision was published by unofficial sources many
years later.
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spokesperson of the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs spoke, although
briefly, about the decision and said that the Supreme Court, in a sevenpage opinion (hereinafter Spanta), decided that the decision of noconfidence vote of Wolesi Jirga was unconstitutional.316
The decision of the Supreme Court in Spanta was brief and the
legal arguments were not intricate. In the first paragraph, the Court
articulated how the case reached the Court.317 The Court did not discuss
whether or not it had jurisdiction over the case.318 Instead, the court
directly quotes the three questions of the government.319 Interestingly,
the Supreme Court then emphasized the independence of the Supreme
Court and the role of the National Assembly,320 a practice that cannot be
seen in the ordinary decisions of the courts in Afghanistan. The
Supreme Court, in the opinion, used language that appeared to establish
itself as the interpreter of the Constitution and clarified the role of each
of the branches.321 Like a primary court, the Supreme Court requested
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs and
the Office of the Secretariat of Wolesi Jirga to submit relevant
documents to the Court.322 The Court requested the diplomatic letters
exchanged between the governments of Afghanistan and Iran regarding
refugees and the attendance sheet listing the members of Wolesi Jirga
on the days of voting.323
In response to the first question, the Supreme Court explained that
Wolesi Jirga was similar to a national court that makes inquiries on the
performance of ministers.324 The Supreme Court added that Wolesi Jirga
adjudicates the guilt of the ministers, and may either tolerate the
minister or cast a vote of no confidence if they find the minister
guilty.325 The Court added that the decision of the national court is final
only if the decision is based on relevant and justifiable reasons.326
Moreover, the Court noted that the decisions should be explicit and
clear, directly relevant to the minister’s non-performance of a specific
duty, and should not have resulted from the actions of persons or
316. See Scott Worden & Sylvana Q. Sinha, Constitutional Interpretation and the Continuing
Crisis in Afghanistan, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, (2011).
317. ROSE LEDA EHLER ET AL., supra note 176, at 81-86
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
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sources whom the minister does not have control over.327 The Court
concluded that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was not competent and
did not have control to prevent, prohibit, nor stop the government of
Iran from expelling Afghan refugees; thus the reasons for the vote of no
confidence were not justified.328
In response to the second question, the Supreme Court argued that
one suspicious vote could not invalidate the rest of the votes and it did
not constitute the majority as required by the Constitution.329 In the
opinion of the Court, the question of the validity of the suspicious vote
was already resolved because of precedent set by Wolesi Jirga in similar
circumstances, which had considered such votes void.330 The Court in its
argument was not actually addressing a constitutional matter.
Conversely, it was referring to internal procedures of Wolesi Jirga.
Reference to sources other than the Constitution creates doubt as to
whether the Supreme Court can go that far and act like an ordinary court
in addressing issues of constitutional interpretation.
Respectively, the Court, in response to the third question, ruled in
favor of the President by arguing that the first round of the vote was
valid and there was no place to reconsider the vote on the same subject
matter.331 The Court referred to Article 65 of the Rules of Procedures of
Wolesi Jirga, which states that after the announcement of the voting
results on a subject matter, no further debate shall take place.332 The
Court also noted the increase in the number of members of Wolesi Jirga
in the second round of voting and questioned the vote of those members
who were absent at the time of speeches of the ministers.333 In the eyes
of the Court, the members who were not present at the time of the
speech and related responses were not in a position to judge the
performance of the ministers.334 A simple interpretation of this argument
is that the Supreme Court meant that the members who were absent
during the questioning and interpellation process should not have
participated in the voting process. If this argument is accepted, many
decisions of Wolesi Jirga, and for that matter Mishrano Jirga, would be
invalid because many members do not participate in the discussions but
do participate in the voting process.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 85.
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Eight members of the Court signed the decision,335 without
mentioning any dissenting opinion. Mohammad Alim Nasimi’s
signature, the ninth member of the Court, was missing; however,
interviews with Supreme Court officials showed that dissent does not
happen in cases of judicial review and interpretation and the Court has
decided unanimously thus far.336As discussed in Part II, lack of dissent
is not a sign of strength of the Court; rather, it may evidence lack of
independence of the Court members in their opinions and impact of
political influence. Spanta illustrated how the constitutional
arrangement in Afghanistan has changed and how the judiciary is
playing a critical role in this new order. It was also a cautionary note to
the new and inexperienced parliament of Afghanistan not to use its
power improperly and incautiously.337
The reaction of Wolesi Jirga to the Supreme Court’s decision was
unsurprisingly negative.338 In the discussions that followed in the
plenary sessions of Wolesi Jirga, several members challenged the
authority of the Supreme Court on making decisions on a political
matter that does not fall under jurisdiction of the Supreme Court..339
Several members of Wolesi Jirga believed that Supreme Court works in
favor of the executive branch.340 There were also views that the
Supreme Court has trespassed on its constitutional authority by deciding
a case of political nature.341 What they meant was that the case of
Spanta was not justiciable and that the Supreme Court should not have
accepted it in the first place.342 Besides, attention soon turned to the
subject of constitutional interpretation. Scholars and members of the
National Assembly posed the question of whether the Supreme Court is
the appropriate constitutionally recognized entity to interpret the
Constitution.343

335. Interview with Mohammad Sediq Zhobl, supra note 48 (on file with author).
336. Id.
337. ROSE LEDA EHLER ET AL., supra note 176, at 81-86.
338. Id. at 85.
339. JOHN DEMPSEY & J. ALEXANDER THIER, Resolving the Crisis Over Constitutional
Interpretation in Afghanistan, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE 3 (2009).
340. Ray Manfi Parlaman Bah Yak Namzad Shurai Aali Estera Mahkama (Parliamnet’s
Negative Vote to a Nominee of the Supreme Court), BOKHDI NEWS AGENCY, (June 2, 2012),
http://www.bokhdinews.af/.
341. Interview with Ghizaal Haress, supra note 127 (on file with author).
342. ROSE LEDA EHLER ET AL., supra note 176, at 171.
343. John Dempsey & J. Alexander Thier, Who Has the Power In Afghanistan? CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (March 2, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0302/p09s01-coop.html.
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Despite successive protests of Wolesi Jirga against the continuance
of the work of the Minister of Foreign Affairs,344 the President insisted
that the Supreme Court’s decision stand and be implemented.345 Spanta
was an alarming case to the National Assembly and, as we have seen in
Part II, the National Assembly proceeded to give the authority of
constitutional interpretation to the newly established ICOIC.346
However, the Supreme Court circumvented that move by declaring
certain articles of ICOIC Law unconstitutional.347
The epicenter of the controversy in Spanta was again Article 121
of the Constitution which says: “The Supreme Court on the request of
the Government or the courts shall review the laws, legislative decrees,
inter-state treaties and international covenants for their compliance with
the Constitution and provide their interpretation in accordance with the
law.348 President Karzai believed that this article authorizes the Supreme
Court to interpret the Constitution.”349 In a letter to Wolesi Jirga after he
vetoed the Law on Structure and Authorities of ICOIC, President
Karzai’s government argued that the phrase “their interpretation” in
Article 121 of the Constitution indicated the intent of the founders of
the Constitution to give the interpretation of laws, legislative decrees,
treaties and international conventions and the constitution itself to the
Supreme Court.350
Farsi and Pashto grammar conventions suggest the word “their” in
Article 121 is a possessive adjective and does not cover the constitution
itself.351 If the textual interpretation of Article 121 is considered, the
Supreme Court does not have the authority to interpret the constitution,
though it does have the authority to interpret the laws, legislative
documents, inter-state treaties and international conventions. However,
merely defining a term from a grammatical point of view may be
misleading. It is of equal importance to study the historical development
of this article and examine the intent of the drafters. The Supreme Court
extensively explained how Article 121 came into existence when it
344. In February 2009, before the Afghan delegation chaired by Spanta headed to
Washington D.C for key strategic talks with American officials, Wolsi Jirga declared that Spanta
cannot be part of this delegation since he is not a minister.
345. ROSE LEDA EHLER ET AL., supra note 176, at 171.
346. KAMALI, supra note 196, at 11.
347. Supreme Court of Afghanistan Opinion No. 5, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE NO.
986.*
348. 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 121.
349. Letter from Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs to Wolsi Jirga, Official Letter No. 945
(May 12, 2008) (on file with author).
350. Id. (on file with author).
351. KAMALI, supra note 196, at 12.
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struck down Article 8 of ICOIC Law.352 The Supreme Court also
disregarded any opinion that stated it does not have the authority to
interpret the Constitution but firmly mentioned that in addition to
judicial review of laws, legislative decrees, inter-state treaties and
covenants, it has the authority to interpret these legislative documents
and the Constitution.353 In 2018, the draft Law on Jurisdiction and
Organization of Judiciary, outlined one article with separate clauses that
clarified the interpretation of the Constitution is a task of the Supreme
Court.354 The reaction of the National Assembly is yet to be seen.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Spanta raised some serious
questions about the flaws of the constitutional interpretation
mechanisms in Afghanistan. These questions can be summarized as
below:
(i) Is the Supreme Court the right legal body to interpret the
Constitution?
(ii) Presume the answer to the first question is “yes”.
Impeachment of a minister is not a legal or legislative decree,
nor is it an inter-state treaty or international treaty. So how can
the Supreme Court decide a case like this? By interpreting the
Constitution, can the Supreme Court invalidate the decisions
made by the Wolesi Jirga, or any other executive entity?
(iii) The Supreme Court is referring to Internal Procedures of
the Wolesi Jirga, Sharia Law principles, and criminal law
concepts in Spanta. Referring to those instruments is only
possible if a case is adjudicated in the lower courts or if one
has appealed to the Supreme Court. By examining other legal
documents, did the Court not expand its scope of jurisdiction?
Spanta is not the only case of constitutional interpretation in
Afghanistan. There are a number of other occasions that the Supreme
Court interpreted the Constitution. In the following subsection, some
key cases of interpretation are outlined.
B. Other Cases of Constitutional Interpretation
1. Addition of Name of Ethnicities in the National Identification Cards
In 2017, President Ashraf Ghani requested his Administrative
Office ask the Supreme Court whether it is constitutional to add more
352. Supreme Court of Afghanistan Opinion No. 5, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE NO.
986.*
353. Id.*
354. Draft Law on Jurisdiction and Organization of the Judiciary (2018) (Afg.) (on file with
author).
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ethnicities to the list of fourteen ethnicities already mentioned in Article
4 of the Constitution regarding National Identification Cards.355 The
Supreme Court argued there is no restriction to add more ethnicities.356
2. Interpellation of Ministers over Budget Expenditure
After reviewing the 2015 expenditure report of the government,
the Wolesi Jirga decided to impeach ministers who could not spend
more than 70% of their development budget in 2015. As a result, seven
ministers were disqualified.357 In the midst of the impeachment process,
the government was quick to request the Supreme Court decide whether
the decision of the Wolesi Jirga was constitutional or not.358
Despite a lot of speculation that Supreme Court has endorsed
Wolesi Jirga’s decision,359 the Supreme Court never provided a response
to this request. Given the political nature of the request, it has been
difficult for the Supreme Court to make such a decision though the case
resembles that of Spanta.
On a number of other occasions, the government asked the
Supreme Court to make a political breakthrough when the elections
were not organized at their constitutionally recognized timetable360 or
when government asked the Supreme Court to find a solution how to fill
in one third of seats of Meshrano Jirga which were vacant because
elections for district councils were not held. The basis for these
decisions was the authority of Supreme Court to interpret the
Constitution.
3. Wolesi Jirga Request for Interpretation of Article 16 of the Afghan
Constitution
Based on Article 121 of The Afghan Constitution, the Wolesi Jirga
is not entitled to request for judicial review or interpretation of the

355. Letter from Admin. Office of the President to the Supreme Court, No. 6922 (n.d.) (on
file with author).
356. Stera Mahkama Afghanistan [Supreme Court of Afghanistan] Judicial Ruling No. 27
(2017) (Afg.).*
357. T’edad wozraa salb selahyat shodeh az soy Wolesi Jirga bh 7 tan resid [Number of
Dismissed Ministers by Wolesi Jirga Reaches Seven], AZADI RADIO (Nov. 15, 2016), https://
www.da.azadiradio.com/a/28118321.html (Afg.).
358. Id.
359. Anisa Shaheed, Supreme Court Upholds Parliament’s Move To Dismiss Ministers,
TOLO NEWS, (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/supreme-court-upholdsparliament%E2%80%99s-move-dismiss-ministers.
360. GHIZAAL HARESS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AFGHANISTAN: A FLAWED PRACTICE 25 (Afg.
Research & Evaluation Unit ed. 2017).
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Constitution;361 however, the Wolesi Jirga filed such a request for
interpretation of Article 16 of the Constitution that emphasizes the
preservation of scientific and administrative terminologies.362 The
Supreme Court subsequently argued that the specific terms used for
university professor titles and names for universities or departments
have been in use for decades and they should be preserved since Article
16 of the Constitution requires preservation of such terms.363
4. Interpretation of Laws, Legislative Decrees and Inter-State Treaties
The Supreme Court uses three words to address the subject of
explaining articles of the laws: (1) Towjih (justification), (2) Towzih
(explanation), and (3) Tafsir (interpretation).364 The way the Supreme
Court justifies or explains law articles is not different from
interpretation. Considering that the language of Article 121 only
mentions interpretation,365 it would have been more useful to only use
Tafsir and avoid using other terms that create confusion.
Cases involving the interpretation of ordinary laws have never
been quite the issue that interpretation of the Afghan Constitution has
been. This is due to the clear language used in Article 121 on
authorizing the Supreme Court to interpret laws, legislative decrees,
inter-state treaties and international covenants.366 Like cases of judicial
review, the Supreme Court has been inconsistent and unpredictable in
receiving and interpreting those documents. In the following
paragraphs, an examination of a few cases of interpretation will
illustrate the inconsistency featured in Supreme Court decisions.
Other examples of statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court
are outlined below:
(i) Article 44 of the Law on Defense Lawyers regarding the
validity of licenses issued before enactment of that law.367
(ii) Article 5 of the Law on Defense Lawyers about the
difference between a Defense Lawyer and a Dispute
Lawyer.368

361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 121.
See Qaza, supra note 161.
Id at 82-83.*
Id at 77.*
2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 121.
Id.
Id. at 77.*
Id. at 77-78.*
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(iii) Articles 10, 24, and 25 of the Nationality Law, about
individuals born of an Afghan and a non-Afghan parent
outside the country.369
(iv) Article 39 of the Law on Elimination of Violence against
Women, about crimes against women that take place outside
the family environment.370 This Law is in force as a legislative
decree.
(v) Request of Civil Society Organizations to decriminalize
cases of women escaping from home due to violence.371
(vi) Request of the Ministry of Justice to interpret the need, or
lack thereof, to have a Family Law when the terms are
addressed in the Civil Code.372
(vii) Request of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to
clarify the monetary punishments based on the articles of the
Constitution.373
(viii) Request of the Ministry of Defense to authorize military
courts to consider issues of corruption committed by military
personnel.374
(ix) Request from the Central Bank, Pashtany Bank, and Bank
Melli to permit the sale of collateral if the Court did not come
to a decision within twenty days, per Article 27 of the Law on
Mortgage of Immovable Properties in Banking Transactions.
The Supreme Court found that Article 27 of this law was
contrary to the Constitution, and the Court announced it as
invalid.375
(x) Requests from Lower Courts to interpret ordinary laws.
Some examples may be found below:
• Kunduz Appellate Court’s request to interpret different
Articles of the Land Management Law.376
• Kapisa Appellate Court’s request for clarification on
articles related to differentiating criminal and civil aspects
of cases when the Government is involved.377
• Badakhshan Appellate Court’s request for clarification
on Article 8 of the Land Management Law.378
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
306.*
376.
377.
378.

Id. at 78-79.*
Qaza, supra note 161, at 80.*
Id. at 80-81.*
Id. at 85-86.*
Id. at 87-88.*
Id. at 89-90.*
SUPREME COURT OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 174, at 303Id. at 248-51.*
Id. at 585-87.*
Id. at 593-96.*
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• Takhar Appellate Court’s request for guidance
regarding the consideration of public service work,
instead of imprisonment for criminal convictions, after
approval from the Minister of Justice.379
• Badakhshan Appellate Court’s request for clarification
on the difference between a “protest” and an “appeal”
under the Government Cases Law.380
While the Supreme Court had accepted a request from Civil
Society Organizations to interpret an article of law, the Government did
not channel a request by the Wolsi Jirga for interpretation of Article 46
of the Higher Education Law to the Supreme Court.381 The Wolsi Jirga
had sent a letter forwarding a complaint by a university professor on the
misinterpretation of his promotion to the Administrative Office of the
President, which asked it to request the Supreme Court to interpret
Article 46 of the Higher Education Law.382 The Administrative Office of
the President wrongfully asked the ICOIC for an interpretation. The
ICOIC rejected the request, arguing interpretation of ordinary laws is
within the authority of the Supreme Court.383 The Administrative Office
of the President then asked the Supreme Court to interpret Article 46 of
the Higher Education Law.384 The Supreme Court rejected the request,
arguing the cabinet should approve the request first.385 The President did
not know about the request and when he realized the matter, instead of
referring the question to the Supreme Court, he asked the Ministry of
Higher of Education to resolve the issue. A comparison of the process
of how requests by Civil Society Organizations and the Wolesi Jirga
were handled is proof that this mechanism can be arbitrary, subjective,
and inconsistent.
The Supreme Court has yet to receive a request for interpretation
of treaties; however, the above examples show how government
agencies, ordinary courts, and even Civil Society Organizations have
been able to file their requests for an answer from the Supreme Court.
The mechanisms in use have been inconsistent and contradictory to the

379.
380.
381.
author).
382.
383.
author).
384.
385.

Id. at 718-20.*
Id. at 721-23.*
Letter from Wolsi Jirga to Admin. Office of the President (July 24, 2016) (on file with
Id.
Letter from ICOIC to Admin. Office of the President (Sept. 17, 2016) (on file with
Letter from Admin. Office of the President to the Supreme Court, supra note 108.
Letter from Supreme Court to Admin. Office of the President, supra note 110.
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prior practice of the Supreme Court. A law describing the eligibility
criteria to file cases and procedures would prevent such inconsistencies.
5. Role of Independent Commission on Overseeing Implementation of
Law
In the Constitutional Loya Jirga, Hamid Karzai pushed for a strong
presidential system while non-Pashtun ethnic representatives
campaigned for a parliamentary system with a constitutional court in
which they could share power.386 Although the President succeeded in
establishing a strong presidential system, the opposition factions
succeeded in establishing the ICOIC on the last day of the
Constitutional Loya Jirga.387 Thus, ICOIC is a result of compromise and
last minute dealings in Loya Jirga.
In its last day of work, the Loya Jirga hastily introduced and
agreed to Article 154 of the Constitution. Thus, it did not have the time
to stipulate to the authorities and duties of the ICOIC. Instead, it was
foreseen that authorities of the ICOIC would be articulated by ordinary
law.388 As Vikram Parekh, a senior analyst with the International Crisis
Group in Kabul, one day after approval of the Constitution in January
2004 stated in an interview: "The main challenges, I think, that lie ahead
when it comes down to implementing the constitution–one will be just
simply clearing up a lot of the ambiguities in the constitution."389 He
continued, "I mean, the draft–there is a last-minute compromise in it
that had a sort of commission for the implementation of the constitution,
but it doesn't clarify at all what the powers of that commission are going
to be. Conflicts between secular sources of law, like international
human rights law and Islamic law, also need to be clarified, as well."390
It was not until June 2010 when the ICOIC was established.391
Moreover, as we have seen in previous sections, the Supreme Court
butchered the ICOIC Law by invalidating selected articles.392 Not
introducing replacement articles further added to the problem.
Considering the Supreme Court verdict on ICOIC Law, this entity has
the following functions:
386. See generally Thier, supra note 8.
387. Id. at 556-67.
388. 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 157.
389. Golnaz Esfandiari, Loya Jirga Approves Constitution, But Hard Part May Have Only
Just Begun, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY (Jan. 8, 2004), https://www.rferl.org/a/
1340558.html.
390. Id.
391. HARESS, supra note 5, at 31.
392. See supra Section III.A.
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(i) Oversight on observance and implementation of the
Constitution by the President, Government, National
Assembly, Judiciary, Offices, and both Governmental and
Non-governmental agencies;
(ii) Provision of legal advice to the President and National
Assembly on issues related to the Constitution;
(iii) Provision of specific proposals to the President and
National Assembly to improve legislation related to the
Constitution;
(iv) Provision of reports to the President on violations of the
Constitution; and
(v) Adoption of internal procedures for the ICOIC.393
The ICOIC Law extended the list of officials who can request legal
advice related to the Constitution to include the President, both houses
of the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, the Independent Human
Rights Commission, the Independent Election Commission, and the
Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission.394 Despite being
the authority to conduct judicial review, there are instances where the
Supreme Court has sought opinions from the ICOIC on certain issues,
although these instances have been informal.395
The ICOIC Law sets forth the two main functions of the ICOIC:
(1) oversight of implementation of the Constitution, and (2) provision of
legal advice related to the Constitution.396 Neither the Constitution nor
the ICOIC Law defines “oversight,” which also contributed to the
weakening of the ICOIC’s authority.397 Recognizing this flaw, a number
of amendments, including a definition of “oversight,” is under
consideration by the ICOIC.398
Given the fact that judicial review is within the authority of the
Supreme Court, the existence of the ICOIC is unique. The advisory job
of the ICOIC is somewhat similar to the advisory functions of the State
Council in France with one difference: the French State Council advises
the government on issues that may not be necessarily constitutionally
related, while the ICOIC advises all branches of the State on issues
relevant to the Constitution.399
393. Law on Independent Commission on Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution,
(Afg.).*
394. Id.*
395. Interview with Ghizaal Haress, supra note 127 (on file with author).
396. HARESS, supra note 5, at 13.
397. Interview with Ghizaal Haress, supra note 127 (on file with author).
398. Id.
399. VISSER, supra note 4, at 13; Law on Independent Commission on Overseeing the
Implementation of the Constitution, (Afg.).*
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The Kenyan Constitution of 2010 also established an entity with
similar authorities to the ICOIC.400 Kenya established the Commission
for Implementation of the Constitution, the main job of which was to
make sure the necessary legislation was in place for the implementation
of the Constitution after its approval in 2010.401The Kenyan
Commission for Implementation of the Constitution was only in place
for five years when it met all the benchmarks for implementation of the
Constitution.402 In Kenya, a concern that the different factions
comprising the National Unity Government would infringe on Kenyans’
rights helped spur the establishment of the Commission for the
Implementation of the Constitution.403 The same concern about
implementation of the constitution that existed in Afghanistan in 2004
exists even today. This concern justifies an oversight body to provide
reports on implementing the constitution, which should remain the main
purpose of an entity like ICOIC.
As discussed in previous sections, judicial review is not an
inclusive process in Afghanistan. It is particularly criticized for being
limited to requests of only the government or the courts.404 For this
reason, ICOIC is playing an important role in providing an alternative
remedy that is available to more institutions.405 ICOIC has issued eightysix legal opinions and interpretation decisions in a span of eight years.406
Legal advice from the ICOIC does not have the same weight and value
as Supreme Court decisions under Article 121; however, it still provides
a chance to hear alternative views.407
The ICOIC has undergone several phases throughout its short life.
In the initial years after its establishment in 2010, the ICOIC played a
critical role and, though the Supreme Court challenged its authorities, it
continued to issue decisions on constitutional interpretation and legal
advice related to the Constitution.408 The Supreme Court’s decision to
declare certain articles of ICOIC Law invalid has affected the ICOIC’s
ability to maneuver.409

400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.

CONSTITUTION art. 262, § 5(6) (2010) (Kenya).
Id.
CONSTITUTION art. 262, § 5(7) (2010) (Kenya).
CIC KENYA, https://www.cickenya.org/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2018).
See supra Section III.C.
HARESS, supra note 5, at 38.
Ghizaal Haress, Questions on ICOIC (Feb. 21, 2018).*
HARESS, supra note 5, at 36.
INDEPENDENT COMM’N FOR OVERSEEING THE IMPLEMENTATION
CONSTITUTION, supra note 164, at 18.
409. HARESS, supra note 5, at 35.
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The start of the ICOIC’s second term in 2016 coincided with
internal conflicts between ICOIC members.410 These conflicts resulted
in the other six members of the ICOIC unseating the Chairperson of the
ICOIC.411 That decision and other claims triggered a period of
instability, resulting in an intervention by the President of Afghanistan,
who appointed a delegation to investigate the work of the ICOIC.412
Merely assigning an outside delegation to investigate the work of the
ICOIC was a big blow to its independence and political clout.413 For a
long period of time in 2017 and 2018, the internal conflicts prevented
the ICOIC from focusing on its main tasks of constitutional oversight
and providing legal advice.
The ICOIC published one report on the violation of the
Constitution,414 indicating it has been unsuccessful in performing its
main job of constitutional oversight. After a simple look into the
activities of the ICOIC in recent years, it is not difficult to realize the
ICOIC has given more attention to their role as a provider of legal
advice compared to constitutional oversight.415
In addition to the ICOIC’s ability to provide legal advice at the
request of entities based on law, the ICOIC has exceeded its authority
by continuing to interpret the Constitution at the request of Wolsi
Jirga.416 For example, in 2011, Wolsi Jirga asked the ICOIC to interpret
Article 106 of the Constitution, a demand that the ICOIC did not reject
and, instead, provided a legal response.417 Respecting the decisions of
the courts is a key element of democratic societies; however, the
competition for getting more power has undermined this key aspect of
democracy in Afghanistan. The ICOIC, which should act as the
controller of implementing constitutionalism, has itself trespassed its
scope of authorities.
The ICOIC has also accepted requests for legal advice from
entities that are not entitled to make such requests. The Ministry of
410. Ali Yawar Adili & Ehsan Qaani, The Constitutional Oversight Commission in a Standoff
with President Ghani: Defending Their Independence or Covering up Mistakes?, AFG.
ANALYSTS NETWORK (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-constitutionaloversight-commission-in-a-standoff-with-president-ghani-defending-their-independence-orcovering-up-mistakes/.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Ghizaal Haress, Questions on ICOIC (Feb. 21, 2018).*
415. HARESS, supra note 5, at 38.
416. Pasarlay, supra note 96.
417. INDEPENDENT COMM’N FOR OVERSEEING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 164, at 71.*
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Justice, the Ministry of Finance among other agencies have made such
requests, but the ICOIC did not deny them.418 Only once did the ICOIC
remind the Administrative Office of the President that the President
must directly authorize its Administrative Office to ask the ICOIC for
legal advice.419 Despite the caution, the ICOIC still provided legal
advice for the sake of cooperation.420 The ICOIC has also provided
opinions sua sponte.421 Since this is not barred by the Constitution or
ICOIC Law, ICOIC members believe there is no legal limitation that
stops them from providing opinions on their own motion.422 As seen in
the above examples, the ICOIC has been inconsistent in dealing with
legal advice on constitutional matters by accepting requests from
unauthorized organizations.
The ICOIC has not only provided advisory opinions on articles of
the Constitution, it has also provided its legal interpretation of articles
of ordinary laws—something that is unauthorized by the Constitution.
For instance, while providing an opinion on the invalidation of certain
government contracts by Wolesi Jirga, the ICOIC quoted articles of the
Procurement Law and gave its interpretation.423 International treaties are
not spared either. The Ministry of Finance, in an official letter, asked for
an interpretation of Article 7 of the Constitution about applying
international treaties.424 In its legal advice, the ICOIC opined that the
ordinary laws of Afghanistan are preferred over executive military
agreements, and they are required to be approved by the National
Assembly.425 These examples illustrate the competition between the
ICOIC and the Supreme Court. However, neither organization has
established a consistent constitutional interpretation or judicial review
mechanism within its sphere of authority.426 Even if the requests did not
fall under the authority of either the ICOIC or the Supreme Court, each
provided its opinion hoping to gain more power in the political
apparatus/structure/forum of Afghanistan.

418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

Id. at 68, 130, 155.*
Id. at 166-167.*
Id.*
Id. at 146.*
Interview with Ghizaal Haress, supra note 127 (on file with author).
INDEPENDENT COMM’N FOR OVERSEEING THE IMPLEMENTATION
CONSTITUTION, supra note 164, at 120-23.*
424. Id. at 130-131.*
425. Id.*
426. HARESS, supra note 5, at 3.
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The ICOIC has asserted that it has the authority to resolve conflicts
between the branches of the State government.427 This authority is not
mentioned in ICOIC governing law, but it seems that the ICOIC feels
there is a gap that it needs to fill. In one case where it provided legal
advice, the ICOIC proposed changes in the law and suggested amending
an article of a law.428 Nevertheless, the ICOIC has failed to act as a
mediator between the Afghan government branches. There is a strong
need for such an independent mediator on political matters, particularly
those which are non-justifiable.429 The ICOIC could have played a more
positive role in that respect. However, internal conflicts have
downgraded the ICOIC to a symbolic entity that is not seriously
considered by the state branches.
Despite the flaws in the ICOIC’s functional mechanisms and
approaches, a comparative study of the legal opinions provided by the
Supreme Court and the ICOIC shows that the ICOIC has been more
professional and intricate in its reasoning. Particularly, in recent years,
the ICOIC has followed a standard format, and published its opinions in
printed and digital form on its website,430 which has been helpful in
providing clarity to its opinions. Another critical difference is that
ICOIC opinions reveal how its members have decided, while such a
distinction is not possible in Supreme Court decisions. On a number of
opinions published on the ICOIC website, some members have not
signed on, evidencing their dissent.431 These little steps can help bring
consistency to issues of judicial review, interpretation, and
constitutional oversight.
Given the availability of two venues for constitutional
interpretation, the executive government and legislature have been
cherry picking favorable responses to their questions, deferring to the
Supreme Court on some occasions and to the ICOIC on others.432 For
example, in 2011, the Council of Ministers asked for interpretation of
Article 7 of the Constitution from the Supreme Court.433 Around the
same time, the Ministry of Finance made a request to the ICOIC on a

427. INDEPENDENT COMM’N FOR OVERSEEING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 164, at 218-22.*
428. Id. at 80-81.*
429. HARESS, supra note 5, at 17.
430. The ICOIC website regularly publishes its decisions in original format at http://www.
icoic.gov.af/fa.
431. Independent Commission on Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution
[ICOIC] opinion No. 5, Jul. 31, 2016 (Afg.).*
432. HARESS, supra note 5, at 16.
433. Qaza, supra note 161, at 83-85.*

FINAL_FOR_JCI

2019]

5/19/2020 5:45 AM

Constitutional Interpretation in Afghanistan

285

similar matter.434 However, since the ICOIC is authorized to provide
only non-binding legal advice, the requesting agencies, including the
President and the National Assembly, simply ignored the opinions of
the ICOIC in some cases.435 This trend can negatively affect the
credibility of the ICOIC and can even drive the ICOIC members toward
a politically-influenced decision-making process in order to attract more
attention from the government and other parties. In addition, the
competition between the Supreme Court and the ICOIC should finish
and each entity should focus on its own mandate. There needs to be a
clear legal framework negotiated by the two institutions.
C. Role of Ministry of Justice
While judicial review is embedded as one of the powers of the
Supreme Court, the Regulation on Organization of Activities of
Ministry of Justice authorizes this Ministry to provide legal advice and
explanations on legislative documents at the request of ministries and
other government agencies.436 The Ministry of Justice responds to the
requests of government agencies merely by identifying the relevant
articles of the laws or other legislative documents. The Ministry of
Justice does not provide detailed explanations of the law, since it does
not want to be held accountable for encroaching on the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction under Article 121 of the Constitution.437
IV. PART FOUR: THE NEED TO REFORM JUDICIAL REVIEW
The analysis of how judicial review and constitutional
interpretation are conducted in Afghanistan highlights the need for
reformed practices. Inconsistency is a common element of judicial
review and constitutional interpretation, which has created confusion
and prompted a strong desire for reform. Judicial review has the
potential to reinforce institutionalization and rule of law in the young
constitutional governments. It not only helps ensure the separation of
powers, but also acts as a mechanism to protect citizen’s fundamental
rights.438 Judicial review was not a familiar phenomenon in Afghanistan

434. INDEPENDENT COMM’N FOR OVERSEEING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 164, at 130.*
435. HARESS, supra note 5, at 37.
436. Regulation on Organization of Activities of Ministry of Justice, AFGHANISTAN
OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 350, art. 4.7 (2019) (Afg.)
437. Interview with Abdul Majid Ghanizada, Dir. of Legislation Inst. (Mar. 10, 2018).
438. Id. at 30; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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when the Constitution was drafted and approved in 2003 and 2004.439
However, lessons have been learned and a redesigned model of judicial
review to bring clarity and consistency is necessary.
In his speech after approval of the Constitution in January 2004,
Hamid Karzai—the then Head of Transitional Government—pointed
out the need to revise the Constitution in the future.440 Afghanistan has
experienced challenges in implementing its Constitution since 2004.441
The number of times the Constitution failed to answer complicated
questions cannot be ignored. Judicial review and constitutional
interpretation are among those failures.442 If opportunity avails, the
ambiguities and inconsistencies of judicial review and constitutional
interpretation in Afghanistan should be resolved through the
constitutional amendment process. However, other solutions should be
sought for the short term.
A. Designing a Workable Model of Judicial Review for Afghanistan
As argued in this article, judicial review requires close attention
and reform. The following section offers two models of judicial review:
The Supreme Court Model and the European Model. Reforming the
current setup is necessary and applying either of the models above
would lead to a better system of judicial review in Afghanistan.
1. Model One: The Supreme Court Model
The current model of judicial review in Afghanistan only gives the
highest organ of the judiciary, the Supreme Court, the authority of
judicial review and interpretation of laws, legislative decrees,
international covenants and inter-state agreements. Unless some
important aspects of the current model are reformed, judicial review
will remain a contentious and inconsistent subject. The following
subsections outline aspects that need special attention and aim to
introduce a model of judicial review that adapts to the contemporary
context in Afghanistan and that is feasible to apply.
Article 121 clearly establishes the authority of the Supreme Court
to conduct judicial review of laws and legislative decrees.443 However,
439. HARESS, supra note 5, at 9.
440. Hamid Karzai, Head of Transitional Gov’t, Speech (Jan. 4, 2004), in SECOND VICE
PRESIDENT OFFICIAL WEBSITE (Afg.).
441. KAMALI, supra note 196, at 34-35.
442. FARID HAMIDI & ARUNI JAYAKODY, SEPARATION OF POWERS UNDER THE AFGHAN
CONSTITUTION: A CASE STUDY 1-2 (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2015).
443. ROSE LEDA EHLER ET AL., supra note 176, at 175.
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there are not elaborate procedures in place on how to conduct judicial
review in a consistent way. Additionally, the issue of interpretation is
not straightforward. In Spanta, the Supreme Court referred to the
historical records of constitution drafting and concluded that the
Supreme Court possessed the authority to interpret the Constitution.444
However, based on the textualism model of interpretation, which
primarily considers the basic meaning of a text, the Supreme Court does
not have the authority to interpret the Constitution.445
One solution is to keep the current model of judicial review but to
make substantial clarifications. This would be made possible by
amending the Constitution.
The following are some of the specific points that must be
considered:
(i) Amend Article 121 in a way that clarifies that the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction over interpretation of the Constitution.
Additionally, it would make sense to add clear language that
shows the ICOIC has the authority to interpret the Constitution
as well.
(ii) It is of great importance to highlight the ability of the
Supreme Court to conduct a priori review of international
treaties.
(iii) The right to petition the Supreme Court to conduct
judicial review needs to be extended to more institutions.
Unlike some other countries in which all courts have the
authority to review the constitutionality of laws, the judiciary
is weak in Afghanistan.446 There are very few judges in
Afghanistan who are intimately familiar with constitutional
concepts.447 Therefore, it is not practical to expand this
authority beyond the Supreme Court. However, it is important
to make judicial review accessible to more officials and
citizens. Institutions such as the National Assembly, the
Independent Human Rights Commission, the Provincial
Councils, and the ICOIC should be able to directly petition the
Supreme Court for judicial review and to interpret the
Constitution, laws, treaties, and conventions. In addition, it
should be clarified that citizens can file their constitutional
review cases in the ordinary courts, and if the court confirms
that there is a real constitutional question, then the court may

444.
445.
446.
447.

ROSE LEDA EHLER ET AL., supra note 176, at 81-86.
HARESS, supra note 5, at 14, 24-25.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 4,16.
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refer the case to the Supreme Court. In other words, courts
should apply concrete judicial review.
(iv) The Supreme Court should urgently propose a law to the
National Assembly that regulates the procedural aspects of
judicial review. Passing a law on this subject will bring
consistency to the decisions concerning judicial review and
raise awareness on how judicial review can preserve
constitutional rights of individuals and institutions.
(v) Whether the Supreme Court can review compliance with
Sharia Law needs to be clarified. Article 3 of the Constitution
prohibits the adoption of any law that is against Sharia;
however, it does not specify the mechanism for compliance
with Article 3.448 It seems there is no better option except for
the Supreme Court to ensure compliance of laws with Sharia.449
This should also be clarified so controversy is avoided in the
future.
(vi) The judges in all levels of judiciary should receive
training on issues of constitutionality.450 This would enable the
citizens to raise issues of constitutionality at the lower courts,
and would allow the lower courts to effectively refer cases of
constitutional review to the Supreme Court.
(vii) The judicial review and interpretation decisions should
be available to the public. Moreover, the Supreme Court
should publish its decisions immediately after a decision is
made.
(viii) Under this scenario, the ICOIC can still survive and
would be given even more responsibilities. The Supreme Court
would not be able to answer political questions.451 The
amendments of the Constitution should be designed in a way to
allow the ICOIC to review political questions and make
binding decisions on those matters. To ensure the
independence of the ICOIC, members should serve for limited,
non-extendable terms, and neither the President nor the
National Assembly should have removal power. It is
paramount that the ICOIC gives equal attention to its oversight
role. Constitutional oversight is usually a complex and
controversial subject; therefore, it is necessary to enumerate
and clarify the ICOIC’s constitutional role. It is critical that the

448. HARESS, supra note 5, at 12; 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12,
§ 3.
449. HARESS, supra note 5, at 13.
450. HAMIDI & JAYAKODY, SEPARATION OF POWERS UNDER THE AFGHAN CONSTITUTION:
A CASE STUDY, supra note 442, at 36.
451. HARESS, supra note 5, at 14, 21.
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current ICOIC law is substantially revised and amended to
accommodate the proposed changes.
(ix) The Constitution should also be amended so as to
explicitly delegate constitutional review authority to an
institution to ensure that regulations comply with the
governing statutes and the Constitution. Article 76 of the
Constitution prohibits any regulation that runs against the body
or spirit of the laws; however, it does not identify which
institution should ensure the legality of the regulations.452 In
many countries, administrative courts hold this authority.453
Afghanistan is in the process of establishing administrative
courts as part of the judiciary. If established, administrative
courts are the most suitable entities to ensure the legality of
regulations.
2. Model Two: The Establishment of a European Model of
Constitutional Review
The second and more preferred option for implementing judicial
constitutional review is to establish a Constitutional Court in
Afghanistan. Establishing an independent body not only rescues the
judiciary from deciding political disputes, it also ensures that a
specialized body addresses issues of constitutional compliance. The
recent example of the Supreme Court’s hesitation in deciding the faith
of seven ministers, whom Wolesi Jirga impeached, is proof that a
Constitutional Court can do a better job when it comes to political
matters.
The Constitution must be amended to establish a specialized
Constitutional Court. If a specialized court is instituted to decide
constitutional matters, there will be no need for the ICOIC. It could be
dissolved, and its responsibilities could be assigned to the Constitutional
Court. Certain Articles, like those under the first draft of the 2004
Constitution, could be used as the foundation for the Constitutional
Court.
Professional legislators should draft unambiguous provisions into
the Constitution, creating the Constitutional Court without leaving any
room for guesswork or interpretation. The Constitutional Court should
be the only entity authorized to hear constitutional review matters.
Furthermore, it should be mentioned clearly that the Constitutional
Court not only has jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of laws,

452. Id. at 13.
453. VISSER, supra note 4, at 59-61
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legislative decrees, acts of the government, regulations, and
international treaties, but that it also has the responsibility to interpret
the Constitution.
Access to the Constitutional Court is also of utmost importance.
As described under the first scenario, it is important that access to
judicial review mechanisms be expanded and more institutions, and
even individuals, be able to bring their claims. At a minimum, the
primary branches of government, a certain number of parliamentarians,
provincial councils, the Human Rights Commission, and other
important agencies should have access to request that the Constitutional
Court review or interpret the Constitution and other legislative
documents. A simplified method should also be available for
individuals to file their cases directly with the Constitutional Court or
other courts able to exercise concrete review by submitting questions to
the Constitutional Court.
Furthermore, it should be recognized that Afghanistan is
experiencing many new constitutional questions and sometimes,
whether due to security or financial reasons, it is not able to comply
with all the terms of the Constitution. For instance, the government has
not been able to hold timely elections.454 While not encouraging
deviation from constitutional provisions, questions such as delay in
elections, oversight of elections or abolishing political parties could also
be addressed under the authority of the Constitutional Court.
The proposed tasks assigned to the Constitutional Court can
impact the constitutional and political structures of Afghanistan. Thus, it
is essential that the members of this Court: (1) receive a vote of
confirmation from the elected parliament and (2) have their terms of the
members be restricted to fixed and non-extendable terms.

454. Id. at 24.

